In Nejati v. Royal Indemnity Co., 2008 WL 483496 (N.D. Tex., February 19, 2008), Royal was sued by Nejati to enforce a $1.4 million default judgment obtained against Royal’s insured under a commercial auto policy. Nejati obtained a default judgment because the insured failed to forward suit papers to Royal and repeatedly refused to communicate with Royal about the lawsuit. Royal received actual notice of the suit from Plaintiff's counsel but it did not file an answer on its insured’s behalf because the insured never made a claim, never asked for a defense, and refused to cooperate with his insurer's efforts to try to protect him. Royal also never issued a reservation of rights or submitted a non-waiver agreement. It did, however, engage in limited discussions with Nejati’s attorneys once it was notified of the suit including asking for an extension of the answer date to enable to it contact the insured and including trying to settle the lawsuit before a default judgment was entered. On February 19th, Federal District Court Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn from the Northern District of Texas ruled on cross motions for summary judgment filed by Nejati and Royal.
The court denied summary judgment determining two fact issues existed: (1) whether Royal was prejudiced by its insured’s breach of the cooperation clause; and (2) whether Royal waived the cooperation clause as a condition precedent to coverage through its conduct. Consistent with the actions of other Texas courts in recent months, this court implicitly rejected the concept of “prejudice as a matter of law” in finding the referenced fact issues despite the insured’s gross failure to cooperate or to even demand defense or indemnity benefits from his liability insurer. While there is nothing uniquely significant about this decision, it does illustrate an unfortunate trend among Texas courts (both state and federal) in the last 12 months to refuse to recognize "prejudice per se" when an insured refuses to make a claim, refuses to cooperate, and allows a default judgment to be entered. While these decisions seem superficially beneficial to policyholders, they are actually harmful to policyholders over the long run. For example, the efforts of the insurer to try to repeatedly contact the insured, to ask for an extension of time to answer, and to ask opposing counsel how much he wanted to settle the case are obviously good things for the insured. But, as this case illustrates, if such "good efforts" are going to actually increase the insurer's exposure by creating a fact issue as to its actual prejudice, then the obvious lesson is for insurers to not try to help their insureds and simply wait for actual notice from their insured and wait for a demand for a defense before lifting a finger. That is a very, very dangerous precedent, but it is the unfortunate implication of the refusal of Texas courts' to recognize prejudice per se or prejudice as a matter of law following late notice.
