Two Oklahoma Federal Courts Rule on Diversity Issues in Insurance Disputes
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The duty to defend, in the context of a contribution lawsuit between insurers, and the right to pursue appeal after an unfavorable summary adjudication ruling, were the subjects of a decision from California’s Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District (Los Angeles).
In Monticello Insurance Company v. Essex Insurance Company (2008) __ Cal.App.4th __ (2008 WL 1851316), the court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Monticello failed to prove on motion for summary adjudication/judgment that Essex had a duty to contribute to the defense of a general contractor (“GC”) in a construction defect case. Monticello was the direct insurer of the GC and Essex insured the GC as an additional insured under a policy issued to a drywall subcontractor. While the legal principles of equitable contribution may not be new, the case is an example of what evidence was found to be inadequate to substantiate the right to contribution. Both the trial and appellate courts (even though reviewing by different standards) found Monticello failed to show there was a potential that the drywaller’s work caused damage to other property.
Continue Reading...Water’s Edge Homeowners Association v. Water’s Edge Associates, et al., Superior Court of the State of Washington for Clark County, Case No. 05-2-03446-1 (2008) is a good example of how, when allowed adequate discovery, an insurer was able to reveal to the court the true collusive nature of a covenant judgment between the insured and the injured party. The case is on appeal to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division II, Case No. 374153.
In Water’s Edge, a construction defect case, plaintiff Homeowners Association entered into a settlement agreement with the defendants, wherein defendants stipulated to entry of judgment in the amount of $8,750,000, which included a cash payment by defendants of $215,000. Plaintiff covenanted not to execute the judgment against defendants and defendants assigned to plaintiff the defendants’ rights under a bad faith suit against defendants’ insurers, and defendants’ rights under a malpractice suit against defense counsel. Defendants also retained the right to recoup from their insurers the $215,000 payment. The settling parties then sought a ruling on the reasonableness of the settlement in order to establish the presumptive damages in the bad faith suit against defendants’ insurers.
Pennsylvania has become the latest state to weigh in on the controversial question of whether an insurer that is later held not to owe coverage for a case may recoup its defense costs in a subsequent coverage suit against its policyholder.
In the decade since the California Supreme Court recognized such a right, courts around the country have come to widely different conclusions about whether or when to allow recoupment. Some have focused on the necessity of the insurer having expressly asserted such a right when it agreed to provide a defense. If so, some courts have found that am implied contract was created and that the insured, having obtained the benefit of the insurer's defense, must also fulfill its duty to reimburse if coverage was held not to exist. Other courts, notably the Supreme Courts of Illinois and Texas, have rejected any argument that the insurer can unilaterally impose such a duty or has an implied right pursuant to theories of quantum meruit.
Continue Reading...Q: When is a claim for damage to property not "property damage"?
A. When it doesn't involve physical injury to or loss of use of tangible property?
So says the Vermont Supreme Court in a recent coverage dispute arising out of a building contractor's failure to use cedar shingles of the right color and quality in the construction of the plaintiff's home. The court ruled in Down Under Masonry, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Company that the contractor's liability insurer had no duty to defend inasmuch as the use of white cedar shingles instead of red cedar shingles as contracted for (as all fans of shingles know, red cedar is much the superior product) had not caused any physical injury to the plaintiff's home or caused him to lose the use of it. The court concluded that it would not "find coverage for aesthetic damage under a CGL policy that does not explicitly provide for it."