Vermont Supreme Supreme Weighs In on Allocation And Other Pollution Coverage Issues
Even as briefing has begun before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court with respect to the issue of allocation, Vermont has joined the growing number of Northeastern states adopting a “time on the risk” approach in long-tail cases. In its first comprehensive assay into the murky world of environmental jurisprudence, the Vermont Supreme Court has ruled in Towns v. Northern Security Ins. Co., 2008 VT 98 (Vt. August 1, 2008), that (1) a continuous trigger is appropriate, not “manifestation;” (2) the own property exclusion does not apply to groundwater contamination; (3) even de minimis levels of environmental contamination constitute “property damage;” and (4) a waste hauler’s use of debris from his business to redevelop his personal home is not subject to the “business pursuits” exclusion in a homeowner’s policy.
This insurance coverage dispute arose out of dumping activity by Richard Towns between 1972 and 1987. Towns operated a waste hauling business. Over time, he culled some of the debris from his business and used it to fill in a steep embankment at his house. Some of the debris was also used to fill in a swimming hole in front of the property.
Towns sold his home in 1987. Thereafter, the new owners, concerned about the fill, contacted the Vermont Attorney General’s Office which ultimately issued an order to Towns directing him to engage an environmental consultant and clean up the property.
Towns initially sought coverage for the state’s claim from Vermont Mutual, which had insured him after he sold the property in 1987. Ultimately, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s ruling that the Vermont Mutual policy did not cover the loss. Towns v. Northern Security Ins. Co., 726 A.2d 65, 67 (Vt. 1999).
Thereafter, Towns sued Northern Security, which had insured him between 1983 and 1987. Northern Security disputed its claimed obligations, citing the “business pursuits” exclusion in its homeowners’ policy and contending that the loss in question had “manifested” after its policies had expired. These arguments were for the most part rejected by a state trial court in a 2007 opinion although the court declared that Northern Security was only liable for its “time on the risk” (25%) as its coverage had only been in effect for four of the sixteen years that Towns had lived there.
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the “business pursuits” exclusion did not apply. Although the debris had been generated in the course of the insured’s business, the court held that what was relevant was the dumping activity, which is subject to the non-business exception to the exclusion. This point was contested by Chief Justice Greiber, who argued in a dissenting opinion that the sheer amount and duration of the fill activity was clearly integral to the insured’s waste hauling business.
The Supreme Court also rejected Northern Security’s reliance on the “own property” exclusion. In keeping with the approach followed by most courts, the court held that groundwater contamination was a public resource and not the insured’s “own property.” The court also rejected Northern Security’s argument that because the groundwater contamination was below state action levels, it did not satisfy the policy’s requirement of “property damage.”
The court suggested, however, that the exclusion might yet apply to any costs that were solely related to the insured’s property, as distinguished from the cost of preventing third-party property damage.
The court also rejected Northern’s argument that a manifestation trigger was appropriate, declaring instead that it would follow the majority rule which applies a continuous trigger to claims of this sort where the disposal activity and resulting damage was ongoing over a period of years.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court also sustained the lower court’s decision to limit the insurer’s obligation to that portion of defense and indemnity during its “time on the risk.” The court noted that a “time on the risk” method offers several policy advantages including spreading the risk to the maximum number of carriers, providing a ready means of identifying each insurer’s liability through a relatively simple calculation and avoiding the necessity for subsequent indemnification actions between or among insurers. In cases of this sort, the court held that as the policy was self-insured, it was fair and reasonable to require the insured to bear responsibility for that portion of total defense and indemnity for which he or she chose to assume the risk.
Vermont is an unusual state within which to litigate environmental coverage issues. Unlike states in southern New England, Vermont lacks the type of heavy industry that have historically generated significant numbers of environmental claims in the past. On the other hand, insurers for the most part have been denied the opportunity to include pollution exclusions by reason of regulations followed by Vermont regulators since the early 1970s. Even so, there has been a relative dearth of clear appellate case law construing the availability of insurance coverage for such claims.
The Towns opinion may ultimately be particularly important in two respects. First, it reenforces the growing consensus in the Northeast and New England that "all sums" has no place in insurance jurisprudence. Although the Massachusetts SJC has a proud tradition of forging its own path without regard for the views of sister states, it is less likely to view "time on the risk" as a made up argument by insurers where allocation has been approved by the Supreme Courts of Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and now Vermont.
Second, this is the rare case (Security in Connecticut being another), where a court has explicitly applied allocation principles to the duty to defend. As many of these cases (e.g. ConEd, EnergyNorth) have arisen in the context of excess policies, the focus of most cases has been on insurer's claimed indemnity duties. Towns rightly affirms that the same analysis applies to the scope of an insurer's duty to pay or reimburse defense costs.
