In 1998, the California Supreme Court, consistent with contract interpretation rules, took a literal approach to what is meant by “suit” in liability insurance policies, ruling that when not otherwise defined, “suit” means a proceeding brought in a court of law by the filing of a complaint. Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857. The Supreme Court went on from there in subsequent decisions to hold that policies that pay when the insured is “legally obligated to pay damages” require money damages ordered by a court. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Superior Court (“Powerine I”) 24 Cal.4th 945. California is in the minority in this approach.
Justice Joyce Kennard has long criticized these rulings, and in her comments in her concurring opinion to the latest on this topic from California’s highest court, notes that “the decision here is a step in the right direction.” However, this new case is not an erosion of the “suit” rule so much as a finer drawing of the "bright line" around the rule.
In Ameron International Corp. v. Ins. Co. of State of Pa., __ Cal.4th __ (2010) (2010 Cal.Lexis 11679), the California Supreme Court held that where the insurance policies did not define the term “suit,” there was a duty to defend and indemnify a contractor that settled a government claim in an administrative adjudicative proceeding before the United States Department of Interior Board of Contract Appeals (“IBCA”). The California Supreme Court, on the narrow issue before it, found Foster-Gardner did not apply because there was a complaint requirement and trial-like features in the administrative adjudicatory proceeding.
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