Complaint Alleging Trespass But Not Physical Injury Does Not Trigger Duty To Defend

 

In Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Birmingham, Case No., C09-726RAJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82838 (W.D. Wash., August 13, 2010), the court found that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because there were no allegations of property damage or personal injury. In the underlying case Birmingham requested a declaration regarding a property boundary. The defendant in that case brought a counterclaim asserting a right to an order to quite title, injunctive relief, breach of contract, trespass and interference with property rights. Birmingham tendered the defense of the counterclaims to its insurer. Metropolitan denied it had a duty to defend because there was no allegation of covered damage.

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Ninth Circuit Confirms Insurers' Apportionment Rights Under Oregon Law

For more than a year, plaintiffs’ and insureds’ attorneys in Oregon have been citing MW Builders, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31234 (D. Or., Apr. 9, 2009), for the proposition that if a contractor’s negligence results in any covered property damage, then the insurer must pay for all repair costs attributable to the contractor.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s recent reversal of MW Builders represents a substantial victory for insurers embroiled in construction defect disputes.

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Oregon District Court Predicts Oregon State Courts Would Consider Extrinsic Evidence Of The Date A Claim Was Noticed To An Insured When Analyzing The Duty To Defend Under A Claims-Made Policy

The issue of whether evidence beyond the “eight corners” of the complaint against an insured and the policy issued to an insured can be considered to determine an insurer’s duty to defend its insured under a claims-made policy has not been addressed by Oregon’s appellate courts. In the recent Oregon District Court opinion, Harris Thermal Transfer Products, Inc. v. James River Insurance Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72673 (July 19, 2010), Oregon District Court Judge Paul Papak examined the issue and determined that a rigid application of the eight-corners rule would systematically subvert the intentions of the parties to a claims-made insurance contract and result in a distortion of the terms of their agreement. The District Court predicted that, if presented with the issue, the Oregon Supreme Court would not apply the “eight-corners” rule barring consideration of extrinsic evidence of the date a claim was noticed to an insured when analyzing an insurer’s duty to defend under a claims-made policy.

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Oregon District Court Rejects Insurer's Challenge To A Collapse Verdict

In Malbco Holdings, LLC v. Amco Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61848 (June 22, 2010), the Oregon District Court denied the insurer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial, following a $941,268.00 verdict in a first-party collapse case.  The subject policy defined “collapse” as an “abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any part of a building with the result that the building or part of a building cannot be occupied for its intended purpose,” and also provided several examples of circumstances that did not qualify as a “collapse,” including where a “part of a building is standing … even if it has separated from another part of a building.”

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A Oregon District Court Considers Whether A Dissolved Corporation's Liability Policy Constitutes An Undistributed Asset

The issue of whether a liability policy of a dissolved corporation is an undistributed corporate asset capable of being distributed has not been addressed by Oregon’s state appellate courts. In the recent Oregon District Court opinion, Ironwood Homes, Inc. v. Bowen, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59933 (D. Or. June 14, 2010), Oregon District Court Judge Anna Brown examined a dissolved corporation’s motion to dismiss claims against it for failure to state a claim based on the plaintiffs’ failure to allege that the dissolved corporation holds any undistributed assets, and thus lacks the capacity to be sued.  The Ironwood court’s opinion is of interest because the court considered the fact that the dissolved corporation’s liability insurer was paying the attorney representing the dissolved corporation as a factor in its denial of the motion.

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Oregon's Court Of Appeals Considers ERISA Definitions For Undefined Policy Terms

In Employers-Shopmens Local 516 Pension Trust and Western States Health and Welfare Trust Fund of the OPEIU v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America and Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 2010 Or. App. LEXIS 653 (Or. Ct. App. June 16, 2010), the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s grant of defendant insurers’ summary judgment motions.  The central issue of the coverage dispute was the meaning of the term “employee” in both the “Welfare and Pension Plan ERISA Compliance” endorsement to the commercial crime policy that Travelers issued to Local 516 and the materially identical policy that Hartford issued to Western.  The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the principals of a company that provided investment management services to the plaintiffs were “employees” under the definition contained in the policy’s endorsement.

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Limitation On What Constitutes "Waste Material"

In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Leong, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46277 (D. Haw. May 11, 2010), the court found that a policy’s pollution exclusion does not apply to the release from a sewer line that damages a neighboring retaining wall.  Allstate issued a homeowners’ policy to Leong.  Leong was brought in as a third-party defendant in a suit by the neighbor whose retaining wall was damaged against the City of Honolulu.  Allstate agreed to defend Leong, but filed a declaratory judgment action regarding its duty to defend.  The primary issue was whether the damage caused by the release from the sewer line was excluded by a pollution exclusion for property damage consisting of or caused by “waste materials or other irritants, contaminants, or pollutants.”

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Oregon's Court Of Appeals Rules That The Offer Of Judgment Rule Does Not Apply To Insurance Disputes

Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure 54 E provides a route whereby litigants can cut off an opponent’s right to recover attorney fees by making an Offer of Judgment for more than what their opponent ultimately recovers. The Rule encourages settlements by providing a way for a defending party to limit its liability and by forcing plaintiffs to take a hard look at the value of their claims when faced with an Offer of Judgment.

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Oregon's Court Of Appeals Overturns A Jury Verdict Finding Broad Coverage Under An Oral Binder

In Stuart v. Pittman, A134858 (Or. Ct. App. May 5, 2010), the insured convinced a jury that it deserved coverage for extensive snow, ice and water damage to a home under construction.  The insured’s policy clearly excluded the loss, but the insured successfully argued that coverage should be provided under an oral binder that preceded the policy.  The insured’s reasoning was that when he had asked for “course of construction” coverage “although he did not know specifically what that was,” the insurer’s agent had told him that the policy would cover “anything that goes through the cracks … anything for which I might be deemed liable … and anything that the contractor’s coverage did not specify or provide benefit for.”  Because the insurer failed to provide a copy of the policy (with its relevant exclusions) until after the damage had occurred, the insured argue that coverage should be provided consistent with the agent’s representations.

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Insurer Relying Of Split Of Authority Found Liable For Bad Faith Denial Of Duty To Defend

The Supreme Court of Washington held in a case arising from an assault that a split of authority regarding an assault and battery exclusion meant the duty to defend existed, and the insurer acted in bad faith denying the duty to defend.   American Best Food, Inc. v. Alea London, LTD., 2010 Wash. LEXIS 250 (March 18, 2010).  

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Oregon Court Allows Contribution Action Against Settling Insurer

The Oregon Court of Appeals, in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., et al., found that a non-settling carrier may pursue a contribution action for defense costs against a carrier that settles with a joint insured.  The Court of Appeals ruled that London was entitled to pursue its contribution action against carriers that previously settled with Zidell based on the theory of equitable contribution.  London did not seek contribution for amounts paid toward indemnity.  The key holding is:

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District Court Scrutinizes Recoverable Costs and Fees in Liability Coverage Dispute

In Alexander Mfg.v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15514 (February 22, 2010), the plaintiff had brought a professional liability suit against Illinois Union’s insured. Illinois Union agreed to defend its insured pursuant to its applicable policy. When the underlying mediation failed, plaintiff settled around Illinois Union and directly with its insured for $1,300,000, in the form of a stipulated judgment and covenant not to execute, and obtained an assignment of the insured’s policy rights.

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A Common Sense Approach to First Party Collapse Coverage

Summary judgment was recently granted to State Farm in the case of Ass'n of Unit Owners of Nestani v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102150 (D. Or. 2009). At issue was potential collapse coverage for substantial and pervasive decay damages at the Nestani Condominiums in Gresham. The State Farm policy provided “collapse” coverage, but only in the event of a “sudden, entire collapse of a building or any part of a building.” The policy defined “collapse” as “actually fallen down or fallen into pieces.”

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Total Pollution Exclusion And Indoor Air Pollution Exclusion Do Not Apply To Indoor Carbon Monoxide Poisoning

In Century Surety Co. v. Casino West, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19807 (D. Nev., March 4, 2010), the court addressed whether the total pollution exclusion and a separate indoor air exclusion applied to all indoor air pollution.  In Century Surety, four people were killed by carbon monoxide poisoning when vapors from the motel’s pool heater room permeated their room because air intake vents had been blocked. 

 

 

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Court Finds "Made Whole" Doctrine Does Not Apply To Insurer Pursuing Its Own Subrogation Interests and Does Not Require Insurer To Reimburse Insured For Deductible

In Averill v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 554 (March 15, 2010), the Court of Appeals in a published decision carved out a significant exception to Washington’s “made whole” doctrine, ruling that an insurer seeking subrogation from another insurer need not make its at-fault insured “whole.” In the process, it criticized the Insurance Commissioner’s Office for changing an existing regulation to now require that an insurer pursuing its own subrogation interests fully reimburse its insured for its deductible from the insurer’s recovery, finding that this rule change an improper application of the “made whole” doctrine and wrong as a matter of law.

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Washington Court of Appeals Reiterates, In Two Recent Opinions, That Where Policy Language Is Clear, It Will Be Enforced As Written

In two recent opinions, one from Division One and one from Division Three, the Washington Court of Appeals reiterated that when policy language is clear, it will be enforced as written. 

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Contractor Entitled To Coverage As Additional Insured For Injury To Employee Of Subcontractor, But Insurer Still Not Obligated To Defend

In Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 16091 (D. Or. Civil No. 09-548-JO, February 22, 2010), the court addressed whether a contractor qualifies as an additional insured under a policy issued to a subcontractor for injuries to the subcontractor’s employees, and if so is it entitled to defense and indemnity.  Providence contracted to remodel a home and hired Woodmaster as a subcontractor.  During the course of the work, one of Woodmaster’s employees, Michael Stambough, was injured.  Woodmaster was the named insured under a policy issued by American States and Providence was the named insured on a policy issued by Clarendon.

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Washington's Court of Appeals Finds No Coverage Under A Products-Completed Operations Policy Where The Insured's Product Was Not Defective

In Allstate Insurance Company v. Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation, 2010 Wn. App. LEXIS 351 (Wn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2010), an unpublished opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s finding at summary judgment and held that a products-completed operations policy did not provide coverage for claims for injuries that arose from the negligence of the vendor of the insured’s product and not from any defect in that product.

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Western District of Washington Rejects Jurisdictional Challenge to Insurer's Request for Declaration of Coverage Obligations

In Canal Indemnity Co. v. Adair Homes, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 590 (W.D. Wash. January 4, 2010), the court denied an insured’s FRCP 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party. The insurer, Canal Indemnity, brought the declaratory judgment action against its insured, Adair Homes, to determine whether two commercial general liability policies it had issued provided coverage for certain faulty construction claims.

 

The insured, a home builder, argued that its subcontractor, GEM Construction, and its three insurers were necessary parties because in their absence the insured would not be able to obtain a “complete and adequate adjudication of the insurance coverage potentially available to it.” As one of the subcontractor’s insurers was, like Adair Homes, a Washington resident, joinder would defeat diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the insured argued, the federal case should be dismissed for inability to join an indispensable party, and the coverage issues should be resolved in state court.

 

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Oregon's Supreme Court Examines "Proof of Loss" in ORS 742.061

In Parks v. Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon, 2009 Or. LEXIS 1014, filed on December 24, 2009, the Oregon Supreme Court examined what constitutes “proof of loss” in the context of ORS 742.061, which requires an insurer to pay an insured’s reasonable attorney fees if (1) the insurer fails to settle the insured’s claim within six months of the date that the insured files a “proof of loss,” and (2) the insured brings an action against the insurer and recovers more than any tender that the insurer has made. The Court held that the insureds had filed “proof of loss” when they telephoned their insurer’s agent seeking help with the cost of cleaning up methamphetamine contamination at an insured rental property. The Court’s holding reversed that of the Court of Appeals which had concluded that as the methamphetamine contamination was excluded from coverage under the particular policy, the insureds’ telephone calls about the methamphetamine contamination could not constitute “proof of loss.”


 

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Court Upholds Limited Definitions of "You" and "Policyholder

In Laird v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2009 Or. App. LEXIS 1810 (Nov. 18, 2009), the court interpreted the term “policyholder” in the context of an automobile policy. Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident where the driver of the other vehicle was allegedly not authorized to use the vehicle. The unauthorized user was the friend of the boyfriend of the daughter of the named insureds. The insurer argued that only the parents were “policyholders” and therefore only they could authorize the use of the vehicle.

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Oregon District Court Addresses a "Multi-Unit Residential Building" Exclusion

In FountainCourt Homeowners’ Assn. v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107403, filed on November 16, 2009, District Court Judge Ann Aiken, employed Oregon law to examine the application of a “multi-unit residential building” exclusion in a commercial general liability policy. In FountainCourt, the plaintiffs were two owners’ associations representing condominium and townhome unit owners at FountainCourt, a development containing both condominiums and townhomes. American Family insured the siding contractor involved in the construction of FountainCourt, and the general contractor was an additional named insured under the siding contractor’s American Family polices. After plaintiffs sued the general and siding contractors for construction defects at FountainCourt, the general contractor tendered the defense and indemnity of the plaintiffs’ claims to American Family. American Family denied the tender, relying in large part on the policies’ exclusion for multi-unit new residential construction. The plaintiffs then filed a breach of contract action against American Family alleging bad faith.

 

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No Coverage Under Fungus Endorsement Where Cause of Loss is Excluded

In Marsh v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., ___ Or. App. ___, (2009), an opinion issued on October 14, 2009, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that damage caused by water leaking from a shower was not covered under the terms of the particular homeowners’ policy.

 

The insurer appealed a judgment for its insureds asserting that the homeowners’ policy did not provide any coverage for the insureds’ claim. The insureds cross-appealed, assigning error to the trial court’s limitation of their recovery to $5,000.

 

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Oregon District Court Finds No Coverage to Remove and Replace an Insured's Defective Work

In Shilo Inn, Seaside Oceanfront, LLC v. Grant, et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75255 (D. Or. Aug. 24, 2009), the District Court of Oregon granted summary judgment to an insurer, ruling that an exclusion for property damage to “[t]hat particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired, or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it” barred all coverage for the costs of replacing the insured contractor’s defective work.

 

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Washington's Supreme Court Overturns Law Requiring Plaintiffs to File a Certificate of Merit in All Medical Malpractice Lawsuits

In an opinion issued on September 17, 2009, the Washington Supreme Court struck down RCW 7.70.150, a law that requires plaintiffs to file a certificate of merit with regard to all medical malpractice lawsuits. In Putnam v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, ___ Wn. 2d ___, (2009), the Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the law is unconstitutional “because it unduly burdens the right of access to courts and violates the separation of powers.”

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The Washington District Court finds that the "Efficient Proximate Cause" Doctrine does not Automatically Trump Mold Exclusions when Mold is not the Efficient Proximate Cause of the Loss

In AXIS Surplus Ins. Co., et. al v. Intracorp Real Estate, LLC, et. al., the Washington District Court, Judge Coughenour, recently ruled in favor of the Insurers on the application of Mold Exclusions irrespective of the fact that efficient proximate cause was potentially a covered peril. This coverage dispute arises out of a claim made by the insured under two “all-risk” Builders Risk insurance policies for alleged moisture, mold, and related damages to a mixed-use condominium project that resulted primarily from faulty and defective construction. The Claimants argued that because the efficient proximate cause was a covered peril, the Mold Exclusions have no application under Washington’s “efficient proximate cause” doctrine. The Insurers argued that the Mold Exclusions should apply regardless of the rule.

 

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Issue of Enforceability of a Release at a UM Arbitration Makes Insurer Ineligible for the Statutory Attorney Fee "Safe Harbor" Provision

In an opinion issued on August 19, 2009, the Oregon Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a dispute concerning the enforceability of a release is an issue that relates only to “damages.” In Cardenas v. Farmers Ins. Co., ___ Or. App. ___, (2009), the Oregon appellate court affirmed the trial court and held that the dispute at issue was not limited to damages alone, and so the defendant insurer does not qualify for the “safe harbor” immunity from attorney fees established by ORS 742.061(3). The appellate court remanded to the trial court to determine what fees are reasonable.

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Oregon District Court Addresses the Meaning of "Condominium" in a CGL Policy

In Bridgetown Condominium Homeowner’s Assn. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51568, Judge Anna Brown of the Oregon District Court recently examined the meaning of the undefined term “condominium” within the meaning of a CGL policy. In Bridgetown, the plaintiff homeowner’s association had previously settled a state court action with a defendant developer for claims at a condominium project. The project consisted of fourteen single-family dwellings. The plaintiff entered into a stipulated judgment with the insured defendant in which the plaintiff agreed it would seek a portion of the stipulated judgment amount from the defendant’s insurer. The plaintiff then brought this garnishment action against the insurer.

 

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Washington Supreme Court Unanimously Finds No Duty to Defend

It is encouraging, after the incredible Woo case (duty to defend dentist who inserted fake boars tusks into his employee’s mouth for photographs while the employee was under anesthesia), to have the Washington Supreme Court unanimously find, albeit in the title insurance context, that there are cases in Washington where an insurance company can properly deny a duty to defend.

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Where's the roof? Oregon's Court of Appeals Confirms that Undefined Policy Terms are not Necessarily Ambiguous

 

Insurers should welcome the Oregon Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Dewsnup v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, A136394 (July 1, 2009), because it signals the Court’s reluctance to accept insureds’ arguments that ordinary words are ambiguous -- and must be construed in their favor -- if they are not defined by the policy. In the process of rejecting a water damage claim under a homeowners policy, the Dewsnup Court reiterated in favorable language Oregon law regarding the interpretation of insurance policies.

 

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Ninth Circuit Affirms Application of Exclusion for "Pilot or Crew Member in an Aircraft"

In Woodworth v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 15068 (9th Cir. July 8, 2009), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on its interpretation of an exclusion for “Loss caused by or resulting from: . . . an injury while the Covered Person is acting as a pilot or crew member in an aircraft.” The dispute arose out of an airplane accident in which flight instructor Roger Woodworth lost his life. Plaintiff, the deceased’s wife, argued that the exclusion should not apply, since it was unknown whether her husband was actually controlling the aircraft at the time that it crashed. She asserted that, because the insurer bears the burden of showing that an exclusion applies, the exclusion would not apply unless Stonebridge proved that her husband was in control of the plane at the time of the crash.

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Ninth Circuit Addresses Timing of Notice of Claim to Insured Under Claims-Made CGL policy

In Evanston Insurance Company v. OEA, Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10921 (May 21, 2009), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of “notice” under a claims-made policy. The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of California, holding that, under a claims-made policy, the insured’s unreasonable subjective belief that a complaint does not evidence an intent to hold the insured liable for injuries will not create a genuine factual dispute as to when the insured’ received “notice” of the claim where the complaint clearly names the insured and specifically alleges that the insured is liable for injuries.

 

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Oregon Court of Appeals Addresses CGL Policy's Definition of 'Temporary Worker'

In Rhiner v. Red Shield Insurance Co., issued May 27, 2009, the Oregon Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether an individual whom an insured hired directly, and who filed a workers’ compensation claim against the insured for on-the-job injuries is an “employee” or a “temporary worker” within the meaning of the policy. The appeals court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the insured, and remanded for entry of judgment for insurer holding that because the insured hired the individual directly, and not with the aid of a third party, the individual was not a “temporary worker” within the meaning of the policy, and the policy did not provide coverage of his claims against the insured.

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Ambiguous Instructions from the Ninth Circuit Result in a Potentially Problematic Ruling for Insurers in Allocation Cases

 

In MW Builders, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, District Court Judge Haggerty held that an insurance company must bear the burden of establishing which portions of an arbitration award were reasonably allocable to covered claims where “circumstances of the underlying action should have compelled the insurer to seek an allocated verdict or advise the insured of the need for one.”

 

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Oregon's Court of Appeals Rules for Insurer on Products - Completed Operations Hazard Exclusion

In Bresee Homes, Inc. v. Farmers, the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Farmers based on an exclusion for damages within the products-completed operations hazard in the context of a construction defect claim involving water intrusion. The insured, a general contractor, constructed a residence in 1999. Claims were brought against the insured in 2005. Farmers denied coverage for the loss based on an endorsement excluding coverage for property damage included within the products-completed operations hazard. On summary judgment in the trial court, the insured failed to submit any evidence as to the timing of the property damage, arguing that a material issue of fact existed and the insurer had failed to prove otherwise. The insured further argued that the court should consider evidence, in determining whether the exclusion was ambiguous, that Farmers had paid on similar claims. Finally, Bresee argued that Farmers waived the ability to rely on the exclusion.

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Oregon's Court of Appeals Defines "Collapse"; Rules on Scope of Coverage

In Hennessy v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., A133592 (April 29, 2009), Oregon's Court of Appeals adopted a “none of the above” approach to first-party “collapse” claims. The majority of jurisdictions that have considered the undefined term “collapse” have found coverage to be triggered by one of the following three circumstances: (1) a finding of substantial impairment to structural integrity, (2) a finding of an imminent collapse, or (3) an actual collapse, being an actual falling down and/or reduction to rubble. In Hennessy, Oregon’s Court of Appeals held that the undefined term “collapse” “requires only that an object fall some distance.” Thus, in Hennessy, a collapse was found where a portion of a building’s stucco exterior had separated from the building wall but had not yet fallen to the ground.
 

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Oregon Federal Court Addresses Who Is An Insured

In Mt. Hood, LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16775 (March 3, 2009), the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon analyzed whether an individual and a corporation qualified as insureds under a policy issued to a condominium homeowners association. The HOA, Collins Lake Resort Homeowners Association, sued Mt. Hood, LLC and Kirk Hanna for damages based on breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties. The complaint alleged that Mt. Hood was the developer and that Hanna was both a board member of the HOA and a representative of Mt. Hood. The HOA alleged that Mt. Hood and Hanna were aware of construction defects at the resort and failed to inform the owners. The HOA also alleged that Hanna breached his fiduciary duty by assisting Mt. Hood in not paying its share of expenses and repair costs while Hanna was on the board of directors of the HOA. Mt. Hood and Hanna claimed that Travelers breached its insurance contract by denying the duty to defend.
 

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Ninth Circuit Holds Anti-Assignment Clause Ambiguous

In Alexander Manufacturing, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Trust v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6396, the Ninth Circuit held that an anti-assignment clause prohibiting assignment of “interest under this Policy” was ambiguous. Plaintiff AMI, an employee stock ownership plan, sued three former AMI directors who were insured under a Directors & Officers policy issued by Illinois Union. Through settlement, AMI received an assignment of the directors’ rights under the Illinois Union policy. As assignee, AMI then filed suit against Illinois Union for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

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Alabama Supreme Court Holds Insurer Not Liable for Malpractice of Retained Defense Counsel

In Lifestar Response of Alabama, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 2009 Ala. Lexis 39, Lifestar Response of Alabama, Inc. (“Lifestar”) brought a legal malpractice action against its defense lawyers and its insurer, Admiral Insurance Company (“Admiral”), for failing to have a default judgment set aside in the underlying action. Admiral had agreed to defend Lifestar under a reservation of rights. The primary question before the Court was whether Admiral could be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of defense counsel. Lifestar alleged Admiral had a duty to defend Lifestar in the underlying action and that Admiral retained defense counsel as Admiral’s agent to perform the defense obligation. (There was some dispute over whether Admiral first retained defense counsel or if Lifestar retained them and Admiral then agreed to pay their fees, but that did not appear relevant to the Court’s ultimate decision.) Lifestar essentially argued that Admiral breached its insurance contract by providing a substandard defense and that because defense counsel were agents of Admiral, defense counsel’s negligence and/or wantonness should be imputed to Admiral.

 

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Colorado Appellate Court Addresses Coverage for Resulting Damage

In General Security Indem. Co. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 2009 Colo. App. LEXIS 215 (February 19, 2009), the Colorado Court of Appeals addressed the definition of occurrence in the context of property damage to work done by a subcontractor and that company’s sub-subcontractors. The homeowners’ association for the Summit at Rock Creek filed suit against D.R. Horton for alleged construction defects. D.R. Horton in turn sued its subcontractors, including Foster Frames, for indemnity. Foster Frames in turn filed a fourth-party complaint against its sub-subcontractors. General Security insured Foster Frames. General Security then brought an action against the insurers of the sub-subcontractors for contribution and indemnity. General Security brought motions for summary judgment against the defendant insurers arguing that each had a duty to defend Foster Frames, as an additional insured, against the D.R. Horton complaint.

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Oregon's Court of Appeals Rules in Favor of Insured on Statute of Limitations Issue

In Pritchard v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Oregon, 2009 Or. App. LEXIS 51 (January 28, 2009), Oregon’s Court of Appeals reversed a trial court judgment that dismissed an insured’s claim as untimely. The Complaint, filed in December of 2006, alleged that the insurer, Regence Bluecross, breached its health insurance policy by unilaterally changing the terms of the policy in May of 1999 to cover the insured’s growth hormone medical treatments as a prescription drug benefit instead of as a major medical benefit. The change resulted in Regence Bluecross paying only 50% of the medication expense rather than the 80% it had been paying previously.

 

 

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Oregon Federal Court Rejects Outrageous Conduct Claim by Insured

In Mancuso v. American Family Muutal Insurance Company, (D. Or. January 16, 2009), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3361, the court found that an insured had not presented facts sufficient to show outrageous conduct on the part of the insurer in denying an insurance claim for goods destroyed by a fire. In May 2005, a fire destroyed Mr. Mancuso’s shared 10’ x 20’ storage unit.  When initially asked about the value of the contents, Mr. Mancuso replied it was somewhere between $25,000 and $50,000.  Six months after the fire Mancuso had not actually filed a claim so the insurer closed its file.  Approximately one year after the fire, Mancuso submitted a claim form that was 500 pages long and claimed a loss of more than $750,000. The claim was referred to the insurer’s fraud unit for investigation. Investigators interviewed Mr. Mancuso and his ex-wife.  The insurer denied the claim in total based on its conclusion that every item on the claim form was false.  The insurer also offered to settle the claim, but Mancuso did not respond to an offer. Mancuso brought claims for breach of contract, attorney fees, Outrageous Conduct, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”), and defamation. The decision involves the insurer’s partial summary judgment motion against the claims for Outrageous Conduct, IIED and defamation.

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Court Rejects "Rigid Approach;" Applies Limitation on Suits Clause as Written

In Fabozzi v. Lexington Insurance Company, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1109, at ** 1-2 (2009), the Court upheld a limitations of suit clause while rejecting the insureds’ arguments that the limitation period “did not begin to run until all conditions precedent to recovery under the policy were satisfied,” and that the insurer should be estopped from asserting the limitations period because the insurer had repeatedly assured them that the claim would be paid.
 

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Limitation to Specified Tanks Upheld

In Cain Petroleum Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Company, Court of Appeals of Oregon, A134133 (December 3, 2008), the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld a distinction in a “Storage Tank System Third Party Liability and Cleanup Policy” between scheduled and unscheduled underground storage tanks (“USTs”). The policy provided coverage for environmental cleanup costs and third party liability caused by releases from a “scheduled storage tank system” at a “scheduled location” after a “retroactive date.” It was undisputed that the location at issue was a scheduled location and that the location included three scheduled tanks installed in 1994. It was also undisputed that the retroactive date on the policy was 1991. Finally, it was undisputed that the contamination at the site did not come from any of the three scheduled USTs.

 

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The Supreme Court of Washington Clarifies "Bad Faith" and Consumer Protection Act Claims

The Supreme Court of Washington’s recent decision in St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Onvia, Inc., 2008 Wash. LEXIS 1055 (November 26, 2008) addressed two claims commonly alleged against insurers in coverage disputes: “bad faith” and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The matter reached the Court upon certified questions from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The first question was whether an insured has a cause of action under Washington law “against its liability insurer for common law procedural bad faith for violation of the Washington Administrative Code and/or for violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW, even though a court has held that the insurer had no contractual duty to defend, settle, or indemnify the insured?” Second, assuming a ‘yes’ answer to the first question, must the insured “prove that the insurer’s conduct caused actual harm, or should the court apply a presumption of harm?” Third, “[h]ow should damages be measured?” 2008 Wash. LEXIS 1055 at *2.

 

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Washington Supreme Court Reverses Court of Appeals' Ruling that an Insurer Should be Allowed to "Litigate to Finality" Defenses

In Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. T&G Construction, Inc., 2008 Wash. LEXIS 1041 (Oct. 23, 2008), the Supreme Court of Washington was “asked to balance the interests of an insured defendant in reaching a reasonable settlement with a claimant against the insurer’s interest in fully litigating its insured’s legal obligation to that claimant.” Although Mutual of Enumclaw (“MOE”) had “vigorously defended its insured,” a siding contractor, in the underlying construction defect case, “MOE declined to participate in the final round of settlement talks.” 2008 Wash. LEXIS 1041, 1. After those settlement talks resulted in a $3,300,000 settlement, MOE objected to the settlement in a reasonableness hearing, arguing that the insured should have prevailed on the basis of a statute of limitations defense and, therefore, the settlement number was considerably too high. Id. at 5. The judge at the reasonableness hearing reduced the settlement to $3,000,000 but otherwise upheld the settlement as reasonable. Id. at 6.

 

 

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Oregon Supreme Court Requires Auto Insurer to Reimburse Insured for Residual Diminution in Value

In Gonzales v. Farmers Insurance Company, 2008 Ore. LEXIS 965, 1 (2008), the Supreme Court of Oregon considered the extent of an insurer’s indemnity obligation where repairs failed to restore an insured vehicle to its “pre-accident condition.”  Following an accident which damaged the insured’s 1993 Ford pickup, the insured paid $6,993.40, minus the deductible, in repair costs. 2008 Ore. LEXIS at 3.  The repairs were sufficient to get the truck back on the road, but the insured contended that, despite the repairs, “[t]he vehicle had a number of problems that did not exist before” the accident. Id. at 21.  The insurer did not commence any further repairs and refused to make any payment for residual diminution in value. Litigation followed.

 

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Ninth Circuit Upholds Punitive Damages Award Reduction, Agrees Evidence Such That Jury Could Have Found Insurer Acted With "Evil Mind"

In Leavey v. Unum Provident Corporation, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2114 (9th Circuit October 6, 2008), the Ninth Circuit in an unpublished decision affirmed an Arizona federal trial court’s reduction of a jury’s $15 million punitive damage award to an insured to $3 million because $15 million was constitutionally excessive.

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U.S.D.C. for Southern District of Mississippi Allows Insurer to Correct Admission as to Operative Policy

Geico Insurance Co. v. Hall, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77347 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 1, 2008) presents at least some evidence that in some states insurers are able to make mistakes and still prevail. When Geico filed its complaint, it included a copy of the insurance policy Geico claimed was the operative policy at issue. Under that policy, the limits were arguably as much as $200,000 for defendant’s claim against Geico’s insured. (Defendant also alleged that the insured’s copy of the policy was lost during Hurricane Katrina.) Later in the case, Geico discovered and presented what it claimed was the actual policy, with an endorsement that established available limits at $25,000.

 

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No Errors and Omissions Coverage for Fraudulent Mortgage Practices

For insurance companies reminiscent of the surge in environmental pollution claims in the early 1980s and now wondering if they will be the ones “left holding the bag” with respect to the still unfolding mortgage crisis, the First Circuit’s recent decision in New Fed Mortgage Corporation v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 20695 (1st Cir. Mass., September 30, 2008), should provide some reassurance.

 

During a four month period in early 2006, a commissioned mortgage broker for New Fed Mortgage arranged fifteen mortgages through the use of altered credit reports. The result was that the lender incurred greater risk than it had bargained for and, consequentially, faced a loss on resale of the loans. After the lender discovered discrepancies between credit reports submitted by New Fed and credit reports obtained independently, the lender demanded indemnification from New Fed. Following an internal investigation, New Fed concluded that one of its brokers had scanned legitimate credit reports into an outside computer system, altered those reports and then printed the fraudulent reports for submission to lenders. New Fed followed its investigation with a claim to its insurance company, National Union.

 

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Oregon Court of Appeals Decides ZRZ Realty Co. v. Beneficial Fire, et al.

 

In ZRZ Realty Co. v. Beneficial Fire, et al. (Or. Ct. App., Oct. 1, 2008), the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled on appeals brought by insureds, ZRZ Realty, Zidell Marine, and others (“Zidell”) and Lloyds of London (Lloyds”) regarding trial court rulings reached in 2002 and 2003.  The appeal concerned a wide range of issues including burden of proof, the definition of occurrence, availability of attorney fees, and allocation.  The Court’s primary holding was that since the insured had the burden of proving coverage, the insured had the burden of proving that the property damage was caused by an “unexpected and unintended” event when that language is used in the definition of occurrence. Oregon law had been clear that the burden was on the insured to prove coverage. Prior cases, however, seemed to not distinguish the unexpected and unintended requirement in the definition of occurrence with the exclusion for expected or intended injury.  The Court of Appeals clarified that the insured bears the burden of proving that the event was unexpected and unintended.  Since the trial court has placed the burden of proof on Lloyds, the Court remanded for a new trial.

 

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Insurer's Dividend Decisions Protected By Business Judgment Rule

 

The California appellate court (Los Angeles County) held the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in State Farm’s favor in a class action that sought to question decisions made as to the amount of dividends paid to policyholders. Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2008) __ Cal.App.4th __ (08 C.D.O.S. 12449). The policyholders claimed State Farm breached a duty to pay billions of dollars as dividends, which created an excessive surplus.

This decision in the case comes after ten years of litigation. Initially the case was dismissed on demurrer, but the appellate court reversed that decision, ruling plaintiffs had plead enough to proceed with their lawsuit for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith, and unfair business practices. Thereafter a nationwide class of 50 million present and former policyholders was certified. The court, after reversal by the appellate court, determined Illinois law applied since State Farm’s corporate business was handled in Illinois.

In 2005, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. The trial court granted the motion on the basis that policyholders could not question the decisions of the board of directors of State Farm. California’s appellate court affirmed, ruling that while policyholders of this mutual insurance company do not have a right to a dividend, State Farm “was obligated to consider from time to time whether dividends should be declared.” (Emphasis by court.)  In its considerations, State Farm “was bound by a duty of care, requiring the Board to make decisions in a prudent manner.” The policyholders argued that State Farm failed to act prudently, failed to deliberate, and merely rubberstamped management’s decisions.

State Farm relied in part on the business judgment rule, which (under Illinois law) presumes that directors of a corporation make business decisions on “an informed basis, in good faith, and with the honest belief that the course taken was in the best interests of the corporation.” This is a rebuttable presumption. Exceptions to the rule exist where, in the process, there is evidence of fraud, oppression, dishonesty, total lack of merit, illegality, or failure of the board to become sufficiently informed to make an independent decision. The business judgment rule does not focus on the merits of the board’s decision.

The court found State Farm’s decisions were protected by the business judgment rule and no exception applied. The evidence presented showed the board was involved, considered various factors, and made its own decisions on whether dividends would be paid.

Court Finds Insurers' Inadequate Investigation was Bad Faith, Imposes Coverage by Estoppel

In Aecon Bldgs., Inc. v. Zurich, et al., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59515 (W. D. Wash.) (August 4, 2008), the Western District of Washington held two insurers liable for bad faith as a matter of law for inadequately investigating a construction defect claim before denying the claim, which was not covered. The two insurers insured two subcontractors who worked for the general contractor and named as an additional insured the general contractor, Aecon Buildings, who built a casino and hotel project for the Quinalt Indian Nation in Washington. After the project was completed the Quinalt nation sued Aecon for construction defects Aecon tendered the claim to the two insurers as an additional insured under the subcontractors’ policies. The insurers both denied Aecon’s tender on the grounds that their policies ended before the project was completed. Aecon sued for coverage and bad faith.

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Mutual of Enumclaw v. USF Ins. Co. ― "Selective Tender" and its Effect on Contribution and Conventional Subrogation Claims Between Insurers in Washington

As Washington counsel, we agree with Michael Aylward that this is an interesting case that warrants review by the coverage world, particularly those doing business in Washington, and add our review to his:

In Mutual of Enumclaw V. USF Ins. Co., Supreme Court of Washington (Sept. 4, 2008), the insured, Dally Homes, Inc. was sued for construction defects in a condominium development. Dally tendered to two of its insurers, Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. (MOE) and Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co. (CUIC), but not to a third insurer, USF Ins. Co. (USF). By agreement with Dally, MOE and CUIC funded the underlying action settlement and received from Dally an assignment of rights against other insurers. MOE and CUIC then brought a claim against USF on the basis of equitable contribution and subrogation.
 

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When is "knowingly" bad conduct still an "occurrence"? Apparently, more frequent than you thought in Texas.

Last Monday, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit considered one of the implications of the Texas Supreme Court’s landmark decision last year in Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 22 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2007), in its decision in National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Puget Plastics Corp. --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 2487054 (5th Cir. 2008).  In doing so, the Fifth Circuit considered a deceptively simple question: could an insured’s "knowing" violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act still be an “occurrence” under a commercial umbrella policy?  In this case, the panel considered National Union’s claim it had no duty to indemnify its insured after the jury in the underlying tort case awarded the claimant $36 million against the insured after having found a “knowing” violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.  In the subsequent coverage case, National Union argued the insured’s actions, which the jury in the underlying suit found to be “knowing,” could not be an “occurrence” under the general liability policy because it could not constitute an “accident.”  Relying on Lamar Homes, the Fifth Circuit stated the “knowing” finding by the jury in the underlying lawsuit did not control the coverage issue because “knowing” in the context of the DTPA only meant “deliberate.”  And, as applied to the case at bar, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the Texas Supreme Court's recent holding Lamar Homes as holding that a “deliberate” act could still be an “occurrence” unless the injury was "highly probable" or the insured "intended or expected the harm that was suffered."  As such, the Fifth Circuit rejected National Union’s argument that a “knowing” violation of the DTPA could never constitute an “occurrence.”  The panel went on to instruct that the coverage lawsuit should include and seek to resolve issues that were not expressly adjudicated in the underlying lawsuit, such as whether the injury caused by the insured was "highly probable, expected or intended."

 

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Tenth Circuit Denies General Liability Insurance Coverage for False Billing Claims

In Zurich American Ins. Co. et al. v. O’Hara Regional Center for Rehabilitation, et al., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12913 (10th Cir., June 18, 2008), the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of whether general liability insurance policies trigger a duty to defend false billing claims. The insured, O’Hara Regional Center for Rehabilitation (“O’Hara”) is a long-term care facility in Denver that was licensed by the State of Colorado to provide specialized nursing home care, and provided such care pursuant to agreements with the United States and the State of Colorado under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. After concluding that O’Hara submitted inflated invoices for patient services, the government sued O’Hara under the False Claims Act and state common law, alleging O’Hara “knowingly presented or caused to be presented claims for payment to the Medicare and Medicaid programs, for care, goods or services not rendered, that were inadequate or worthless, or that were rendered in violation of applicable statutes, regulations and guidelines with a nexus to payment.” The government further alleged that O’Hara “‘systematically and routinely understaffed [the facility]’ in violation of the provider agreements.” LEXIS p. 5. O’Hara tendered defense of the suit to its three liability carriers. Two accepted the defense under a reservation of rights, while the third simply denied coverage. Continue Reading...

Fifth Circuit Applies Pollution Exclusion to Explosion Caused by Gas Vapors

Another court has determined that the total pollution exclusion is in fact “total.” In Noble Energy Inc. v. Bituminous Casualty Company, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11757 (5th Cir. June 2, 2008), the court addressed the applicability of a pollution exclusion to bodily injury from an explosion. Workers were disposing of sediment and water from Noble’s petroleum storage tanks from two tanker trucks. Combustible vapors from the sediment and water caused the diesel engines in the truck to race which led to an explosion and fire. The sediment and water waste included gas condensate. Three employees were killed and several others injured. Bituminous Casualty argued that the pollution exclusion in its policy barred coverage for the claims. Continue Reading...

New York U.S. District Court Dismisses Coverage Complaint for Accident at Non-Scheduled Location

In Ten Seventy One Home Corp. v. Liberty Mutual, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 47328 (2008), the court granted an insurer’s CR 12(b)(6) motion dismissing another insurer’s complaint seeking a coverage determination for a personal injury claim.

On June 14, 2002, Leonard Hutchings was seriously, severely and permanently injured when Morton Yuter closed an overhead garage door on Hutchings’ head and neck at 3001 Arlington Avenue in the Bronx, New York. Josh Neustein and Ten Seventy One Home Corporation owned 3001 Arlington and used it as an office from which they operated, administered and maintained a number of rental properties in the Bronx and Manhattan.
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Two Oklahoma Federal Courts Rule on Diversity Issues in Insurance Disputes

On May 21, 2008, in Wormuth v. State Farm, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40668, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma awarded a plaintiff insured attorney’s fees incurred in responding to State Farm’s notice of removal based on fraudulent joinder. Wormuth sued State Farm and two State Farm investigators in Oklahoma state court. State Farm filed a notice of removal claiming the two investigators were fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The trial court disagreed, found no fraudulent joinder and so no diversity jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court.

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Washington Court of Appeals, Division II, Will Consider the Propriety of a Settlement With a Covenant Not to Execute

Water’s Edge Homeowners Association v. Water’s Edge Associates, et al., Superior Court of the State of Washington for Clark County, Case No. 05-2-03446-1 (2008) is a good example of how, when allowed adequate discovery, an insurer was able to reveal to the court the true collusive nature of a covenant judgment between the insured and the injured party. The case is on appeal to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division II, Case No. 374153.

In Water’s Edge, a construction defect case, plaintiff Homeowners Association entered into a settlement agreement with the defendants, wherein defendants stipulated to entry of judgment in the amount of $8,750,000, which included a cash payment by defendants of $215,000. Plaintiff covenanted not to execute the judgment against defendants and defendants assigned to plaintiff the defendants’ rights under a bad faith suit against defendants’ insurers, and defendants’ rights under a malpractice suit against defense counsel. Defendants also retained the right to recoup from their insurers the $215,000 payment. The settling parties then sought a ruling on the reasonableness of the settlement in order to establish the presumptive damages in the bad faith suit against defendants’ insurers.

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Coverage for Wrongful Eviction Extends to Persons, Not Organizations

In Mamaroneck Avenue Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (N.Y.App., 2nd Dept., April 22, 2008), a New York Appellate court held that invasion of an organization’s leasehold interest is not covered under the “personal and advertising injury” provisions of a CGL policy. The underlying complaint alleged that the insured “embarked on a plan of harassment and coercion with the intention of causing [claimant] to terminate its leasehold,” which included allegations of “[t]respassing upon [claimant's] premises and interfering with [claimant’s] business by appearing, unannounced, accompanied by Fire Department personnel and the City Building Inspector . . . to solicit or elicit non-existent fire code violations.” The policy’s definition of “personal and advertising injury” included “wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor.” Noting that other "personal and advertising injury" offenses distinguish between "persons" and "organizations," the court held that wrongful eviction claims apply only to natural "persons."  The court relied on several cases from other jurisdictions to support of its holding, including Stonelight Tile v. California Ins. Guar. Assn., 150 Cal App 4th 19; Mirpad, LLC v. California Ins. Guar. Assn., 132 Cal App 4th 1058; and Supreme Laundry Servs. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 2007 US Dist LEXIS 18134 (ND Ill. 2007).

Product Liability Claim Constitutes Multiple Occurrences

In ExxonMobil Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (N.Y. App., 1st Dept., April 15, 2008), a New York appellate court applies New York’s “unfortunate event test” to find that an insured’s manufacture and sale of two defective products did not constitute a single occurrence for the purpose of determining applicable deductibles, where each installation of polybutylene resin into a municipal water system, and each introduction of a lubricant into an aircraft engine, created exposure to a condition that resulted in property damage to multiple claimants on different dates over many years. In so holding, the court relied on the Court of Appeals' recent  decision in Appalachian Ins. Co. v General Elec. Co., 8 NY3d 162 (2007), and its own holding in International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 46 AD3d 224 (1st Dept.2007).

Sixth Circuit Finds Umbrella Insurers Owe No Duty to Defend Against Antitrust Claims

On April 14, 2008, the Sixth Circuit applying Illinois law ruled that six umbrella insurers owed no duty under their advertising or personal injury coverages to defend or indemnify an insured accused of monopolizing the synthetic thyroid market. The gravamen of the complaints against the insured was that its wrongful monopoly of the synthetic thyroid market caused consumers and health insurers to have to pay higher prices for its product, Synthroid, and kept them from being able to buy lower-cost, equally effective alternatives. The complaints alleged the insured asserted monopoly control by suppressing a physician’s study critical of Synthroid, criticizing her methodology and results, concealing known facts about it and marketing it as a uniquely superior drug despite knowing it was not. The complaints sought economic damages for consumers and health insurers who overpaid for Synthroid. They did not seek damages on behalf of competing thyroid manufacturers and they did not allege defamation, libel, disparagement, or slander. Continue Reading...

Nevada Countersignature Law Struck Down

The Ninth Circuit has struck down Nevada’s countersignature law which required out-of-state insurance agents to get a resident agent to sign off on business written in Nevada. The Nevada statute provided that no authorized insurer may make, write, place, or renew any insurance policy on persons, property, or risks in Nevada, “except through its duly appointed and licensed agents resident in [Nevada], any one of whom shall countersign the policy.” The statute further required that the resident agent be paid a 5% commission for all work written in Nevada. The Ninth Circuit found that the statute created “two classes of insurance agents in Nevada, one class of licensed resident agents that can finalize insurance contracts, and a second class of licensed nonresident agents that cannot.” The Ninth Circuit found that the Nevada law violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution on the basis that “it discriminates against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.”

Washington Court of Appeals Rules on Allocation, Exhaustion and Supplementary Payments

On April 7, 2008, Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals ruled in Great American Ins. Co., et al. v. Assurance Co. of America on a number of allocation, exhaustion and supplementary payment issues. The case concerned the apportionment of “financial obligations” arising out of the equitable reapportionment of financial obligations arising from the settlement of a large construction defect lawsuit against Polygon Northwest Company, a property development company. In that case, several insurers funded a settlement of the underlying action while an umbrella insurer for Polygon, Great American, did not participate in the settlement. Great American argued in this appeal that the trial court erred by finding it liable because its underlying insurer, United Capitol, was insolvent and made no payments towards the settlement. Great American further argued that even if its excess coverage was triggered, the trial court erred by ordering it to pay amounts exceeding the limits of its policy.


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Late Notice: Is Prejudice as a Matter of Law Dead in Texas?

In Nejati v. Royal Indemnity Co., 2008 WL 483496 (N.D. Tex., February 19, 2008), Royal was sued by Nejati to enforce a $1.4 million default judgment obtained against Royal’s insured under a commercial auto policy.  Nejati obtained a default judgment because the insured failed to forward suit papers to Royal and repeatedly refused to communicate with Royal about the lawsuit.  Royal received actual notice of the suit from Plaintiff's counsel but it did not file an answer on its insured’s behalf because the insured never made a claim, never asked for a defense, and refused to cooperate with his insurer's efforts to try to protect him.  Royal also never issued a reservation of rights or submitted a non-waiver agreement.  It did, however, engage in limited discussions with Nejati’s attorneys once it was notified of the suit including asking for an extension of the answer date to enable to it contact the insured and including trying to settle the lawsuit before a default judgment was entered. On February 19th, Federal District Court Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn from the Northern District of Texas ruled on cross motions for summary judgment filed by Nejati and Royal. 

The court denied summary judgment determining two fact issues existed: (1) whether Royal was prejudiced by its insured’s breach of the cooperation clause; and (2) whether Royal waived the cooperation clause as a condition precedent to coverage through its conduct.  Consistent with the actions of other Texas courts in recent months, this court implicitly rejected the concept of “prejudice as a matter of law” in finding the referenced fact issues despite the insured’s gross failure to cooperate or to even demand defense or indemnity benefits from his liability insurer.  While there is nothing uniquely significant about this decision, it does illustrate an unfortunate trend among Texas courts (both state and federal) in the last 12 months to refuse to recognize "prejudice per se" when an insured refuses to make a claim, refuses to cooperate, and allows a default judgment to be entered.   While these decisions seem superficially beneficial to policyholders, they are actually harmful to policyholders over the long run.  For example, the efforts of the insurer to try to repeatedly contact the insured, to ask for an extension of time to answer, and to ask opposing counsel how much he wanted to settle the case are obviously good things for the insured.  But, as this case illustrates, if such "good efforts" are going to actually increase the insurer's exposure by creating a fact issue as to its actual prejudice, then the obvious lesson is for insurers to not try to help their insureds and simply wait for actual notice from their insured and wait for a demand for a defense before lifting a finger.  That is a very, very dangerous precedent, but it is the unfortunate implication of the refusal of Texas courts' to recognize prejudice per se or prejudice as a matter of law following late notice.   

Action against Surety Time-Barred

In J & A Concrete Corp. v St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (N.Y. App., 1st Dept., Feb. 26, 2008), New York’s First Department holds that an action against a surety commenced more than one year after the contractor ceased work was time-barred. The labor and material bond limited the time to commence an action to one year following the date on which the contractor "ceased work." The court finds the term "ceased work" means "stopped performing labor,” and does not include the period in which the contractor may be called upon to finish its contract in the future.

Service of Judgment on Insurer Deemed Condition Precedent to Claimant's Direct Action

A New York appellate court strictly applies the provisions of N.Y. Ins. § 3420 (a) (2), which permits injured claimants to maintain direct actions against insurers only after a judgment remains unsatisfied for thirty days following notice of its entry to the insured and its insurer. In Guayara v. Hudson Ins. Co. (2nd Dept. Feb. 19, 2008), the court dismissed claimant’s action for failure to serve the judgment upon the insurer, a condition precedent to suit under the statute. Service upon the insured’s broker was deemed insufficient to satisfy the condition, even though the broker then forwarded the judgment to the insurer.

Texas Supreme Court Distinguishes "No Notice" from "Late Notice" for Liability Insurers

Last Friday, the Texas Supreme Court answered “no” to the following certified questions from the Fifth Circuit: 

"Where an additional insured does not and cannot be presumed to know of coverage under an insurer's liability policy, does an insurer that has knowledge that a suit implicating policy coverage has been filed against its additional insured have a duty to inform the additional insured of the available coverage?"  and,

"Does proof of an insurer's actual knowledge of service of process in a suit against its additional insured, when such knowledge is obtained in sufficient time to provide a defense for the insured, establish as a matter of law the absence of prejudice to the insurer from the additional insured's failure to comply with the notice-of-suit provisions of the policy?"

In National Union fire Insurance Co. v. Crocker, 2008 WL 400398 (Tex. February 15, 2008), a nursing home resident sued the insured nursing home and its employee for injuries suffered when hit by a door swung open by the employee. The employee was terminated after the incident but before suit was filed. The insurer defended the nursing home but did not defend the employee even though the claims against him were covered and the insurer knew he had been served. The insurer attempted to contact the employee by phone and mail without success. During the suit, the employee spoke privately with plaintiff’s counsel at a deposition but refused to speak with the nursing home’s defense counsel. At trial, the jury returned a take nothing defense verdict against the nursing home but the court entered a $1,000,000 default judgment against the employee. The injured resident then sought to collect against the liability insurer because of its alleged coverage on the employee. 

The federal district court hearing the coverage case found the insurer breached its duty to defend the employee by failing to notify him of the available coverage. That court also found prejudice had to be shown to establish a coverage defense based on late notice and the insurer’s “actual awareness” of the suit against the employee precluded it’s ability to establish the required prejudice. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified the above questions to the Texas Supreme Court. In addressing the notice requirement in last Friday’s decision, the Texas Court observed that a “more basic purpose” of requiring an insured to forward suit papers to the insurer is to advise them that the insured has been served and the insurer is expected to file an answer on their behalf. An insurer’s knowledge that suit has been filed “does not satisfy this ‘more basic purpose’ or require the insurer to “gratuitously subject itself to liability.” The high court noted: “Simply put, there is not duty to provide a defense absent a request for coverage.”

Addressing the prejudice question, the court distinguished its recent decision in PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Co. 2008 WL 109071 (Tex. 2008) (See Texas Insurance Law Newsbrief January 14, 2008), by observing in PAJ the notice was actually late in contrast to the present case where there was no notice from the additional insured at all. Because an insured may opt against seeking a defense from an insurer for a number of reasons, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that “insurers owe no duty to provide an unsought, uninvited, unrequested, unsolicited defense.” As such, the insurer had no duty to inform the employee of available coverage or to voluntarily undertake his defense. And, the high court concluded actual knowledge of the suit against him did not establish prejudice as a matter of law.

Texas Supreme Court Reverses Itself on Contractual Indemnity Coverage

Last Friday, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its 2006 opinion in Evanston Ins. Co. v. Atofina Petrochemicals, Inc., 2006 WL 1195330 (Tex. May 5, 2006) (where the high court found the additional insured provisions of the liability policy were not broad enough to indemnify the third-party's own acts of negligence, but it failed to decide whether the scope of this coverage is limited in any way by the separate indemnity agreement between the third-party and the policy's named insured). Last Friday, the Texas Supreme Court reversed itself and closely examined the interplay between a contractual indemnity agreement and the scope of coverage afforded to additional insureds. In Evanston Ins. Co. v. Atofina Petrochemicals, Inc., 2008 WL 400394 (Tex. February 15, 2008), the court specifically addressed three specific issues: 1) “whether a commercial umbrella insurance policy that was purchased to secure the insured's indemnity obligation in a service contract with a third party also provides direct liability coverage for the third party;” 2) “whether the insurer is bound to pay the amount of an underlying settlement between the additional insured;” and  3) “whether article 21.55 (now Chapter 542) of the Texas Insurance Code, the “Prompt Payment of Claims” statute, authorized the imposition of penalties and attorney's fees for the insurer's failure to pay the claim timely.”

Addressing the first issue involving the breadth of additional insured coverage, the court focused on the policy language defining who is an insured, the provision discussing the named insured’s duty to indemnify the additional insured, and a separate provision defining an insured to include “A person or organization for whom you have agreed to provide insurance as is afforded by this policy; but that person or organization is an insured only with respect to operations performed by you or on your behalf, or facilities owned or used by you.” The court reasoned that each “who-is-an-insured” clause served to grant coverage independently and, therefore, it held the policy provided the broader scope of coverage and did not exclude liabilities arising out of the additional insured’s sole negligence.  

Addressing the second issue of “whether the insurer was bound to pay the amount of an underlying settlement between the additional insured,” the court revisited related decisions and held the insurer’s “denial of coverage barred it from challenging the reasonableness” of the settlement and the insurer was thus bound to pay the $5.75 million settlement. Addressing the third issue of whether article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code applied in this context, however, the court observed the claim in this case was a third-party claim involving the insured’s liability to another and not a first-party claim falling within the statute. Accordingly, the court held that the additional insured was not entitled to attorney fees or damages under article 21.55.

The high court’s treatment of the 21.55 penalty provision is interesting in light of the court’s ruling last month in Lamar Homes where it addressed the same statute in a liability claim involving the duty to defend.   Last Friday’s decision in Atofina Petrochemicals properly ruled the penalty provision does not apply to indemnity benefits under a liability policy.   It still leaves claims for previously tendered defense benefits subject to the 18% statutory penalty pursuant to last month’s decision in Lamar Homes, despite the obvious inconsistency between the two decisions.  A majority of the Texas Supreme Court apparently doesn’t have any problems with applying the 18% statutory penalty to defense benefits under a liability policy when coverage is later determined to exist, but it does have problems applying the same penalty provision to the same claim under the same policy as it relates to indemnity benefits. Friday’s decision in Atofina Petrochemicals is simply a good illustration of why the 21.55 holding in Lamar Homes last month was terribly wrong.  

Texas Supreme Court Holds Public Policy Does Not Prohibit Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages

This past Friday, the Texas Supreme Court issued a important decision on the availability of liability insurance to cover punitive damage awards when it answered the following certified question presented by the Fifth Circuit: “Does Texas public policy prohibit a liability insurance provider from indemnifying an award for punitive damages imposed on its insured because of gross negligence?” In Fairfield Insurance Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, L.P., 2008 WL 400397 (Tex. February 15, 2008), the Court in a limited holding found “Texas public policy does not prohibit coverage under the type of workers' compensation and employer's liability insurance policy at issue in this case.” In doing so, the Court provided an extensive and thought-provoking discussion of the law from other jurisdictions, Texas statutory and legislative considerations, Texas case law addressing the issue in other contexts and public policy issues including the “freedom of contract” and the underlying purpose of imposing punitive damages.

In this case, an employee died as a result of on the job injuries and the resulting lawsuit alleged the insured employer “failed to follow and enforce OSHA safety rules and regulations.” The policy at issue provided workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurance that covered “all sums the insured [Stephens Martin Paving] legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury to [its] employees, provided the bodily injury is covered by this Employers Liability Insurance.”  But, it excluded coverage for damages arising from injuries caused by intentional acts and “punitive or exemplary damages because of bodily injury to an employee employed in violation of law.” However, an endorsement provided “[t]his exclusion does not apply unless the violation of law caused or contributed to the bodily injury.” Because the certified question only focused on the public policy considerations, the court did not address the potential coverage issues and presumed the policy covered the punitive damages sought.

In reaching its decision that coverage for punitive damages was not against Texas public policy, the court focused on the statutory workers’ compensation scheme and accompanying insurance regulations.  The court found because the Texas Workers Compensation Act allowed recovery of exemplary damages caused by the employer’s gross negligence and because the Texas Department of Insurance's execution of that scheme and approval of policy forms reveals an “intent to provide coverage for gross-negligence” while excluding intentional acts, the high court of Texas found the “Legislature’s expressed intent is that Texas public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for claims of gross negligence in this context.”

The decision was one of the oldest cases on the Court's docket probably indicating the intense internal struggle over the important issues raised by this case.   While the holding is troubling to this author at multiple levels, the obvious and easy solution is for liability insurers to craft expansive punitive damage exclusions in their liability policies.  This decision only deals with the public policy implications of extending coverage to punitive damages when the policy is otherwise silent on such coverage. 

34-day Delay in Dislcaiming Coverage Violates N.Y. Ins. Law 3420(d)

New York Insurance Law § 3420(d) requires that insurers provide written notice of coverage denials “as soon as reasonably possible” for accident claims involving bodily injury and death. Courts hold that failure to comply with the statute results in a waiver of policy defenses, and that policyholders need not demonstrate prejudice to invoke the statute’s protection. In measuring reasonableness, however, courts have declined to establish fixed periods of time, concluding that reasonableness is determined based upon attending circumstances. Naturally, the absence of bright-line tests has led to uncertainty and considerable litigation. New York’s high court has addressed the issue several times, concluding in Hartford v. County of Nassau, 46 NY2d 1028 (1979), that absent excuse or explanation, a 60-day delay was unreasonable as a matter of law, and in First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Jetco Constr. Corp., 1 NY3d 64 (2003), that a 48-day delay violated the statute. Courts have rarely found that delays of as few as 30 days violate the statute; however, New York’s Second Department recently held in Sirius America Ins. Co. v. Vigo Construction Corp. (NY App, 2nd Dept. Feb. 5, 2008), that a disclaimer issued just 34 days after the insurer knew or should have known of the basis for denying coverage was ineffective as a matter of law.

Texas Appellate Court Refuses to Recognize Claim for "Negligent Claims Handling"

Recently, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals held State Farm did not breach a contract with its insured after it denied coverage for a mold claim. In Justice v. State Farm Lloyds Ins. Co., 2008 WL 123857 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] January 15, 2008), the insureds made a claim under their State Farm homeowner’s insurance policy after a tree fell on their home. State Farm paid the claim. Later, the insureds discovered mold in the walls of their home and reported the claim to State Farm. After issuing a reservation of rights letter, State Farm contracted with a third-party vendor to remediate the home for $137,000. Thereafter, the insureds filed suit for additional mold damage. Both sides filed a motion for summary judgment. 

State Farm argued the breach of contract claim was barred by the mold exclusion in the policy. The insureds allege the mold exclusion is trumped by a provision of the State Farm Adjuster’s Guide, purportedly stating if the original claim is covered, such as the damage from the wind blown tree, then any loss that proximately results is therefore covered. The insureds, however, failed to provide any legal authority for their position and, as a result, waived any basis for relief on that contention.

The appellate court also summarily dealt with the insureds’ other issues such as extra-contractual claims and negligence on the basis the insureds provided no basis to contradict the trial court’s ruling. Importantly, the court reiterated the principle that Texas does not recognize a claim for negligent claims handling. Lastly, to the extent the third-party contractor was hired by State Farm to identify mold damage that could be covered under the policy, the court ruled the insureds response does not articulate a duty owed to them by the contractor or how its failure to identify the mold could have caused them damage if it was not covered under the policy.

Sovereign Immunity Trumps Forum Selection Clause

In Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2008 NY Slip Op 50161(U) (Sup Ct. NY County, Jan. 24, 2008), New York County Supreme Court considered whether a forum selection clause served as adequate grounds to maintain a declaratory judgment action against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that was otherwise subject to that state’s sovereign immunity. The court concluded it was not, and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Continue Reading...

Insured's Late Notice Vitiates Coverage

In York Specialty Food, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co. of New York (NY App., 1st Dept., Jan. 31, 2008), a New York appellate court has held that an insured, who became aware of the claimant’s accident within three days, but did not notify its insurer of the accident until eight months later, breached the notice requirements of its liability policy. The court rejected the insured’s excuse for delay premised upon an alleged good-faith belief in non-liability because the insured never investigated the possibility of its liability for the accident. The court found that an investigation by the insured that included interviews of employees who witnessed the accident would have revealed that the claimant, after falling in front of the insured's premises, had been taken from the scene in an ambulance. Since no investigation was conducted, the insured could not claim a good-faith belief in non-liability. As continues to be the law in New York, the insured was not required to demonstrate prejudice to invoke the late notice defense.

Waiver Creates Coverage for Uninsurable Losses

An insurer that undertakes the defense of its insured for a sufficiently lengthy period of time without reserving its rights to deny coverage waives coverage defenses. So held the 7th Circuit in Nutmeg Ins. Co. v. East Lake Management & Development Corp. (7th Cir. (Ill.) Jan. 22, 2008) (unreported). In this case, the insurer hired counsel to defend its insured, but did not issue a reservation of rights until two years later. The insurer continued to defend for another two years before issuing a coverage denial. The court concluded that, whether the delay was two or four years, it was too long under Illinois law. The court rejected arguments that the insured was required to demonstrate prejudice by the delay; while prejudice would be required to establish a claim of estoppel, the delay in this case constituted a waiver for which no showing of prejudice was required. The court also rejected arguments that the loss was uninsurable as a matter of state law, and that neither waiver nor estoppel could create coverage for uninsurable losses. Finding no Illinois cases, the court cited precedent in California and New Jersey for the proposition that the defense of uninsurability may be waived or forfeited, and predicted that Illinois courts would agree. Compare this holding with the rule in New York that an insurer cannot through waiver create coverage that a policy was not written to provide (see Schiff Assoc. v. Flack, 51 NY2d 692 (1980); Zappone v. Home Ins. Co., 55 NY2d 131 (1982); Central General Hosp. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195 (1997)). While coverage may be created by estoppel (which requires prejudice), waiver applies only to defenses based on policy exclusions and breach of policy conditions.

Allocation and Occurrence Questions Ceritified to Wisconsin Supreme Court

The 7th Circuit has asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court to address the numbering of occurrences and allocation questions raised by long-tail losses. In Plastics Engineering Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (7th Cir. (Wis.) Jan. 22, 2008), the insured sought defense and indemnity for multiple asbestos claims spanning successive policy periods. The district court had concluded that each person's injury caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products constitutes a separate “occurrence”; that non-cumulation provisions in the policies limited each claimant's recovery to the maximum amount allowed in a single triggered policy for an occurrence; and, that defense and indemnity would be allocated on an “all sums” rather than pro rata basis. On appeal, the 7th Circuit found that Wisconsin law does not provide sufficient guidance as to how the Wisconsin Supreme Court would resolve these issues, and certified these questions to the Wisconsin Supreme Court:

1. Under Wisconsin law, what constitutes an “occurrence” in an insurance contract when exposure injuries are sustained by numerous individuals at varying geographical locations over many years?

2. Does Wisconsin Statute § 631.43(1) apply to successive insurance policies when an occurrence is ongoing and spans multiple insurance policies, thereby prohibiting efforts by consecutive insurers to reduce coverage to the maximum of a single policy period?

3. In Wisconsin, are insurers obligated to pay “all sums” related to the defense and/or indemnification of an injury that triggers one insurance policy; or alternatively, are insurers liable for a pro rata share of defense costs and/or damages depending on how much of the injury occurred during the triggered insurance policy period?

No Evidence of a "Special Relationship" Between the Insured and Agent under Washington Law

The Washington Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment to an insurer and a broker in a failure to procure action on the basis that the insured failed to demonstrate that he had a “special relationship” with the agent requiring the agent to make certain the insured had adequate insurance coverage.




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Reinsurance Claims Consultant Denied

Even though Lumbermen’s reinsurers rebated over $2 million in premiums to LMC after its reinsurance recoveries consultant alerted it to the fact that a change in the manner in which Kember was booking reinsurance premiums was contrary to procedures recommended by the NAIC, the Seventh Circuit has ruled in Indiana Lumbemens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reinsurance Results, Inc., No. 07-1283 (7th Cir. January 16, 2008) that the consultant was not entitled to one-third share of the rebated premiums as it was not the result of any “premium and/or claims identified during the course of the review and have not been processed in accordance with the reinsurance contract terms and conditions” as required under its contract. Rather, the Seventh Circuit held that the change had resulted from an adjustment in Lumbermen’s internal accounting procedures and not as the result of any mistake with respect to how the reinsurance claims had been processed. The court also rejected the consultant’s arguments that it should be entitled to some recovery on a theory of quantum meruit.

Total Pollution Exclusion Applies to Remediation and Non-remediation Damages

The total pollution exclusion was held to apply to property damage resulting from the release of home heating oil in Nascimento v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., (1st Cir. (Mass.) Jan. 18, 2008). The claim arose from soil contamination to an adjacent property from an UST used by the insured to store home heating oil to heat his business. The insured was sued by subsequent property owners for costs incurred in remediating the property, and for property damages. The insured conceded that section (f)(2)(a) of the exclusion barred coverage for remediation damages; however, he argued that the underlying complaint also sought damages to the property apart from the cost of remediation to which the exclusion do  not apply. The court disagreed, holding that section (f)(1)(a) of the exclusion, which bars coverage for “ ‘property damage’ arising out of the actual ... discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants ... at or from any premises, site, or location ... which is or was at any time ... occupied by ... any insured,” also applied to the claim. Though the insured did not own the adjacent lot, he did "occupy" the UST within the meaning of (f)(1)(a). Relying on McGregor v. Allamerica Ins.Co., 449 Mass. 400 (2007), decided after the district court's opinion and while this appeal was pending, the court held that once the oil becomes a pollutant, the total pollution exclusion of the CGL policy is triggered and coverage for remediation and non-remediation claims is barred.

Independent Contractor Exclusion Enforced

In Metropolitan Heat & Power Co., Inc. v. AIG Claims Services, Inc. (NY App., 2nd Dept., Jan. 8, 2008), the court held that an independent contractor exclusion in a general contractor’s CGL policy barred coverage for injuries sustained by a subcontractor hired to install a boiler. The exclusion applied to damages "arising out of operations performed for any insured by independent contractors." The general was also denied coverage under the subcontractor’s policy because it was not explicitly listed as a named or additional insured on the policy. The certificate of insurance, issued for information only, conferred no rights upon the plaintiff as the certificate holder.

Issue of Fact Precludes Summary Judgment on Claim for Additional Insured Coverage

In The Ins. Co. of New York v. Central Mut. Ins. Co. (NY App., 1st Dept., Jan. 15, 2008), the court held that issues of fact whether contract between general and subcontractor required subcontractor to name general and owner of construction site as additional insureds precluded summary judgment. The lower court had determined there was an issue of fact whether the subcontract imposed an obligation on the subcontractor to obtain insurance for the owner, and found no issue of fact with respect to its obligation to obtain insurance for the general contractor. On appeal, the court found the subcontract contained at least one page that was taken from the contract between the owner and general, and a plain reading of the contract between the general and subcontractor mirrored a contract between the general and another contractor, thus raising an issue of fact as to the intent of the parties concerning which entities should be included as additional insureds.

Damages Under Employment Agreement Covered by EPL Policy

In Acradyne, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America (9th Cir. (Or.) Jan. 10, 2008) (unreported), the court held that claims for continuation of pay, compensation reduction, and misrepresentation were covered under an employment practices liability policy, while claims for intentional misrepresentation and unjust enrichment were not. Though the policy excluded severance pay or penalties, the court concluded that damages owed under the employment contract did not qualify as severance pay; continued salary payments did not depend on termination from employment. The court also held that an exclusion from damages for “sums sought solely on the basis of a claim for unpaid services under an express or implied agreement” did not apply to allegations that claimant’s salary was reduced in violation of the agreement, finding the term “unpaid services” was ambiguous. Claims for negligent misrepresentation were likewise covered, though claims for intentional misrepresentation and unjust enrichment were not. The intentional misrepresentation claim was barred by an exclusion for wrongful employment practices known before policy inception. Unjust enrichment was not one of the enumerated practices included in the policy's definition of a “Wrongful Employment Practice.” Since only some of the claims were covered, the case was remanded for the purpose of allocating the settlement between the insurer and insured.

Issues of Fact Warrant Trial on Application of Regulatory Estoppel to Meaning of "Sudden and Accidental" in Pollution Exclusion

In Simon Wrecking Co., Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., (E.D.Pa. Jan. 10, 2008), a federal district court concludes that issues of fact regarding application of regulatory estoppel to the meaning of “sudden and accidental” in a pollution exclusion precludes summary judgment. The insured sought coverage for its alleged involvement in the Malvern TCE Superfund Site. At issue was the meaning of “sudden and accidental” in the pollution exclusion of standard CGL policies introduced in 1970.
The insurer claimed the phrase has a temporal meaning to require an abrupt event, while the insured claimed it is identical in meaning to the phrase “unexpected and unintended” and therefore does not require suddenness. On motions for summary judgment, the insured argued the language was ambiguous; was known in the insurance industry, prior to the filing of the 1970 pollution exclusion, to possess the same meaning as “unexpected and unintended;” and, was represented by the industry to the Pennsylvania Insurance Department to mean “unexpected and unintended,” and that regulatory estoppel therefore prevented the insurer from asserting a different meaning.
The court rejected the first two arguments, concluding that the policy language was not ambiguous, and that there was no issue of fact whether the phrase had a trade usage meaning of “unexpected and unintended.” The insured offered little evidence of this, and the insurer submitted affidavits of several industry officials who stated either that the term was unclear and had no trade usage, or that the term was commonly understood to require an abrupt event.
The court, however, concluded that issues of fact precluded summary judgment with respect to application of regulatory estoppel. The insured presented the affidavit of a Pennsylvania Insurance Department employee who stated the IRB represented to the department that the exclusion was merely a clarification and continued to cover pollution that was “unexpected and unintended,” and an explanation that accompanied the filing of the pollution exclusion which categorized the filing as a clarification of occurrence coverage rather than a major departure from it. The insurer submitted several affidavits of employees of the Pennsylvania Insurance Department who stated they were not misled by the filing of the pollution exclusion. The court reserved the matter for trial accordingly.

Coverage Action Allowed to Proceed While Tort Action Pending

In Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Reed (Fla. App., 5 Dist., Dec. 28, 2007), a Florida appeals court considered whether an insurer with a genuine coverage dispute should be allowed to litigate coverage in a separate declaratory judgment action while the underlying tort action is still pending. The underlying claim arose from a motor vehicle accident that allegedly caused injuries to a passenger on the insured’s motorcycle. The insurer agreed to defend the tort action subject to a reservation of rights based on an exclusion for bodily injury to any person “occupying a covered vehicle … unless you have paid a premium for Guest Passenger Liability coverage.” The insurer then filed this action seeking a declaration that its policy did not provide coverage because the insured had not purchased the requisite coverage. The injured claimant intervened in the coverage action, and moved to abate it until the tort action was resolved. The motion was granted, and the insurer appealed. On appeal, the court held that the coverage action should have been allowed to proceed. Relying on Florida Supreme Court precedent, Higgins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 894 So.2d 5 (Fla.2004), the court concluded that “an insurance company may pursue a declaratory judgment action which requires a determination of the existence or nonexistence of a fact upon which depend its obligations as the insurer under a policy of insurance.” The court considered a number of factors from Higgins relevant to the timing of a coverage action, including: (1) whether the two actions are mutually exclusive; (2) whether proceeding to decision on the indemnity issue would promote settlement and avoid collusive actions between claimant and insured to create coverage; and (3) whether the insured had resources independent of insurance, so that it would be immaterial to the claimant whether the insured's conduct was covered or not covered by indemnity insurance. In this case, the court found the coverage action should be permitted to proceed because the actions were mutually exclusive and the contestability of the coverage issue would likely impact settlement of the tort action.

Claims FIles and Attorney-Client Communications Deemed Discoverabe in Extra-contracutal Claim

In a claim by injured worker against worker’s compensation claims administrator alleging tort of outrage, Alabama Supreme Court holds that claims adjuster’s files were not privileged work-product, and that communications between administrator an its counsel were also subject to disclosure. At issue in Ex Parte Meadowbrook Ins. Group, Inc. (Ala. Dec. 21, 2007) was claimant’s right to “(1) [the] adjuster's claims notes made after [claimant’s] worker's compensation case was filed … up to the filing of this case, and (2) correspondence and e-mails exchanged between [claims administrator] and [counsel hired to defend it] within that time period pertaining to the decision to terminate [claimant’s] worker's compensation benefits.” Court concluded that claims administrator failed to offer evidence indicating contents of claims file were prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial. Court reasoned that since administrator had an independent contractual duty to investigate claim, it could not rely on mere blanket objections, but was required to show when documents were created, why each document was prepared and how it was used. As for communications with counsel, though they were subject to attorney-client privilege, the privilege was deemed waived because administrator was relying on advice of counsel as a defense to the tort claim. Court held that where advice of counsel is asserted in defense to culpability for a decision, plaintiff is entitled to all relevant documents bearing on the decision.

Interest Term In Consent Judgment Held Binding On Insurer

The Washington Court of Appeals has ruled that in a case where the plaintiff and the insured entered into a consent judgment wherein the insured admitted liability and agreed to a judgment of $275,000 with interest to accrue at 12% a year, which judgment was subsequently approved by a Superior Court at a reasonableness hearing, the 12% rate of interest was binding on Scottsdale instead of the ordinary rate of interest provided for under RCW 4.56.110(3) (that would have resulted in interest accruing at a rate of 7.18%). In Jackson v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 59606-3-I (Wash. App. December 17, 2007), the court ruled that when parties to a tort suit settle their dispute in a manner that calls for a specified rate of interest, the resulting judgment is founded on a written contract rather than tortious conduct and is properly subject to the higher rate of interest provided for by RCW 4.56.110.

Asbestos IBNR Outside New Jersey Statute For Liquidation of Insolvent Insurers

The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that thousands of asbestos claims and other long-tail liabilities that have been incurred but not yet reported do not qualify for inclusion in the distribution of the estate of an insolvent insurer as N.J.S.A. 17:30C-8(a)(1) provides that “no contingent claim shall share in the distribution of the assets of an insurer” except as such claims have become “absolute against the insurer.” In In The Matter of Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., No. A-91-06 (N.J. December 13, 2007), the court rejected the Liquidator’s argument that IBNR claims become “absolute” once their value is susceptible of being estimated. Instead, the majority declared that “because the process by which the Liquidator proposes to estimate IBNR claims of necessity entails looking outside of each claim to other similar claims in respect of their very existence, nature and extent and cost, IBNR claims fail to satisfy that most basic element of requirements in order to be “absolute”: [that each] stand on its own and not by reference to any other claim.” Two dissenting justices argues that the majority’s analysis created an unreasonable “Hobson’s choice” for the Liquidator, as it must either pay out the limited assets of the Estate now and leave future claimants without relief or delays payments indefinitely while the Estate meanwhile “hemorrhages” administrative costs.

New Mexico Court Holds That Allstate's Use of Colossus Is Not Bad Faith

The New Mexico Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court’s declaration that Allstate’s use of the computerized claims handling program “Colossus” does not violate the state’s unfair practices act. In Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 26,329 (N.M. App. November 30, 2007) the court ruled that Allstate’s use of the program fell within the regulatory exemption to the UPA set forth in Section 57-12-7 as state market conduct examiners had examined Allstate’s use of Colossus and had previously approved it.

Illinois Courts Construes EPL Coverage

In a case where the insured purchased a commercial package policy that included both CGL and Employers Practice Liability insurance coverage parts, the Appellate Court has ruled that once the cost of defending two defamation and retaliatory discharge claims exhausted the $100,000 EPL limit, the insured was not entitled to coverage under the CGL policy or the umbrella policy, as both policies contained EPL exclusions. In West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rosemont Exposition Services, Inc., No. 1-07-0644 (Ill. App. December 7, 2007), the court ruled that the defamatory statements were clearly work related so as to fall within the scope of the EPL exclusions.

Arkansas Supreme Court Finds Ambiguity In Business Pursuits Exclusion

The Arkansas Supreme Court  ruled in McGrew v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Arkansas, No. 07-421 (Ark. November 29, 2007) that a wrongful death action brought against a nurse who moonlighted as a babysitter was not subject to a “business pursuits” exclusion in her homeowner’s policy. While agreeing that babysitting, although not the insured’s principal vocation, was a “trade or business,” the court found ambiguity with respect to an exception to the exclusion for “activity that minors normally perform” as a reasonable person might determine that the policy covered minors, as well as adults, who were performing activities such as child care or babysitting. The case was therefore remanded for factual findings by a jury in accordance with Arkansas principles of policy interpretation to resolve the perceived ambiguity.

Tow Truck Operator was "Occupying" Tow Truck While Loading Coworker's Flatbed Truck

In Lynn v. Westport Ins. Corp. (3rd Cir. (Pa.) Dec. 12, 2007), the court considered whether a tow truck operator, who was struck by the rear-view mirror of an on-coming vehicle while walking alongside his truck to assist his coworker in loading a disabled vehicle onto the coworker’s flatbed, was “occupying” the tow truck for purposes of qualifying for UM coverage. Applying the four-part test in Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Contrisciane, 473 A.2d 1005 (Pa.1984), the court held that the tow truck operator was “occupying” his vehicle, despite that he had determined the tow truck would be of no use, and that he was assisting his co-worker in loading the flatbed. The court found that the tow truck operator was only away from his tow truck and walking along the side of the road because of his duties as a tow truck driver, and that he was compelled by his duties as a tow truck driver to help his coworker load the disabled vehicle onto the flatbed truck before he could get back into his tow truck and leave the scene.

Insureds' Claim for Damage Caused by Leaking Dishwasher Barred

In Bolan v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., (Mich. App. Dec. 11, 2007), insureds made claim for coverage under a homeowner's policy when they discovered softening in the floor around their dishwasher caused by a dishwasher leak during the drain cycle. Plaintiffs acknowledged that the dishwasher had been leaking for some time before they noticed softening in the floor. The policy excluded loss resulting directly or indirectly from an “inherent vice, latent defect or mechanical breakdown”; however, damage caused by the escape of water from a domestic appliance was excepted from the exclusion. The policy also excluded loss resulting directly or indirectly from “constant or repeated seepage or leakage of water or steam from within a ... domestic appliance which occurs over a period of weeks, months or years.” Court held that while the insureds could recover for loss caused by water escaping from a domestic appliance under the exception to the exclusion, the claim was nevertheless excluded because of the duration of the leak.

Insurer's Delay in Denying Coverage Justified by Need for Investigation

In Hermitage Ins. Co. v. Arm-ing, Inc., (NY App., 2nd Dept., Dec. 11, 2007), court held that insurer’s two-month delay in disclaiming coverage occasioned by its need to investigate to determine when its insureds received notice of the accident was reasonable under Ins. Law 3420(d); however, insureds raised issues of fact whether they notified the plaintiff of the claim as soon as practicable, as required by the relevant insurance contract sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Oregon Court Of Appeals Finds That If Driver Has Any Ownership Interest in Car, He Is Not A Driver "With Consent" And Thus Not an "Insured" Under the Owner's Auto Policy

Weber v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (Or. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2007)


The Teuberts were injured when the car they were traveling in was struck by a car driven by Ronningen. The car driven by Ronningen was insured by State Farm under a policy issued to Weber. Weber and Ronningen lived together and when Weber expressed a desire to purchase a car, she paid $1,000 towards the purchase of a car with Ronningen signing a note for the $20,000 balance. The note stated it was consideration for sale of the car to Ronningen, and the bill of sale identified Ronningen as the buyer. Ronningen completed and submitted an Oregon DMV application for the title and registration of the car, listing himself as the sole owner and took title to the car despite the understanding that the car would be Weber’s. After the purchase, Weber added the car to her State Farm policy and paid the insurance premiums. On the day of the accident, Ronningen asked Weber for permission to use the car. In the report filed with the DMV regarding the accident, Ronningen listed himself as the owner of the car.



The Teuberts sought damages from Ronningen for their injuries and Ronningen sought coverage under Weber’s State Farm policy. The policy stated State Farm would defend and indemnify “an insured.” Additionally, under the policy “insured” included any person driving with Weber’s consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that Ronningen maintained some type of ownership interest in the car and thus was not a driver with Weber’s “consent” to use the car for the purposes of the policy. The court determined that a certificate of title to a vehicle, which Ronningen had to the car, was prima facie evidence of ownership and that the evidence did not support a finding that Ronningen had no ownership interest in the car. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment to State Farm was affirmed.

Gagnon v. Alias Ins. Co., Wis. App. December 4, 2007)

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has ruled  that a trial court did not err in holding that a product manufacturer had failed to present evidence of the existence and material terms of a missing 1982 CGL policy.  Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that even had such a policy existed, the undisputed evidence was that the trigger of coverage for such CGL policies was the occurrence of injuries during the policy period and that the policy would therefore not have applied since even though the belt sander in question was manufactured in 1982, it did not injure the underlying claimant until 2002.

Coverage Allowed for Sexual Assault by Insured's Employee

NYAT Operating Corp. v GAN National Ins. Co. (NY App., 1st Dept., Dec. 6, 2007)

In an action for defense and indemnity for claims that insured’s employee sexually assaulted claimant, court held that because insured’s liability was based on negligent hiring and retention of employee, not respondeat superior, sexual assault was covered “accident” within meaning of policy, and expected/intended harm exclusion did not apply. Court also held that late notice defense was waived by insurer’s failure to timely notify disclaim coverage. Dismissal of insured’s complaint for its default in opposing insurer’s CPLR 3126 motion did not estop claimant, as intervener, from asserting insured's coverage under policy.

Earth Movement Exclusion Bars Coverage for Property Loss

Labate v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (NY App., 2nd Dept., Nov. 29, 2007)
In a claim for coverage under a homeowner’s policy for damages sustained to insureds’ house when walls cracked and the concrete basement floor slab settled and cracked, the court held that an earth movement exclusion in the policy clearly and unambiguously applied to the property loss. The insurer's expert and the insureds' own engineers hired to remedy the conditions opined that the property damage was caused directly or indirectly by earth movement and settlement.

Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Coverage Case on Basis of Pollution Exclusion

This coverage case arose from an underlying case brought against the policyholder for violation of CERCLA for the policyholder’s alleged “contamination of two Superfund sites in eastern Arkansas.” The policyholder filed suit against the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company ("PMA") seeking coverage under several insurance policies allegedly issued from 1967 to 1978 and alleging that PMA acted in bad faith under Pennsylvania law for its failure to defend or indemnify it in the underlying suit. The policies from 1967 to 1972 were lost while the 1972 to 1978 policies existed and contained a pollution exclusion which contained an exception for “sudden and accidental” discharges.

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Insured Establishes Reasonable Care in Maintaining Heat to Vacant Premises

In an action for coverage for damage sustained to vacant property resulting from freezing water pipes, the court held that the insured established he used reasonable care to maintain heat in his building at the time the plumbing system froze. In Gallo v. Midstate Mut. Ins. Co. (NY App., 4th Dept., Nov. 23, 2007), plaintiff submitted testimony of his property manager stating that he had restored electricity to the building before the loss by removing tabs in the electric meter. Plaintiff also submitted the testimony of the rental agent stating the electricity was on and the furnace blower was operating properly to heat the building at the time of loss. The utility company’s documents indicating it had no record of electrical service to the property were deemed insufficient to raise an issue of fact. Thus, the court conlcuded that summary judgment on the issue was properly granted in favor of the insured. The insurer’s contention—that the property manager’s acts in restoring electricity to the building could not constitute reasonable care because they constituted theft of services—was not considered by the court, as the argument was raised for the first time on appeal. The court also concluded that an exclusion for accidental discharge or overflow of liquids or steam from a plumbing system did not unambiguously apply in this case.

Delayed Notice of Accident Untimely; Insurer Need Not Show Prejudice

In St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. (NY App., 1st Dept., Nov. 20, 2007) , court held that insurer properly disclaimed coverage where insured delayed seven months in providing notice of accident. Evidence established that insured was immediately aware of accident, which occurred in front of its property while contractor was performing work on its behalf; and, that a person was injured and removed by ambulance. Moreover, insured was familiar with policy’s notice provisions. Court also held that insurer need not demonstrate prejudice to invoke late notice defense.

National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association

The Fifth Circuit has asked the Mississippi Supreme Court to answer whether a medical malpractice insurer whose “other insurance” clause made it excess to PHICO must nonetheless accept coverage in light of PHICO’s insolvency or whether the State Guaranty Fund bore responsibility.   Earlier this year, the supreme court ruled that the exhaustion requirements of Miss. Code Ann. §83-23-123 did not apply to coverage available to a co-defendant, holding in Mississippi nsurance Guaranty Association v. Cole, 954 So.2d 407 (Miss. 2007) that the MIGA’s obligations were not excused by sums paid by the insurer of a joint tortfeasor.

Oregon Supreme Court Finds "Accepted Coverage" a Single Event for the Purposes of Recovery of Attorney Fees in a PIP Dispute

The Oregon Supreme Court recently modified a prior decision finding that its interpretation of “accepted coverage” was incorrect.  In this case, the insured had prevailed in a personal injury protection (PIP) dispute with his insurer and sought to recover his attorney fees under ORS 742.061.  This statute provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled to recover fees with the exception that no fees are required to be paid if the insurer has “accepted coverage” and “the only issue is the amount of benefits due the insured.”  In the court’s prior opinion, it held that neither of the conditions had been met for the exception to apply.  Progressive moved for reconsideration on the basis that the court erred in concluding that it had not “accepted coverage” as the court incorrectly found that the phrase was “not limited to a one-time decision . . . but rather is an ongoing series of decisions.”  Pointing to other provisions of the statute, Progressive argued that “acceptance of coverage” is a single event that must occur within six months from the date that proof of loss is filed with the insurer.  The court agreed with Progressive and modified its prior decision, stating that its prior interpretation of “accepted coverage” was incorrect.

UM Coverage Available to Driver of Tractor Involved in Accident While Loading onto Insured Truck; Driver Deemed "Occupant" and "User" of Truck

In Keefer v. Ferrell (W.Va. Nov. 8, 2007), plaintiff was operating a tractor for the purpose of loading it onto a nearby truck owned by the insured. He was approximately 25 feet from the truck, and was turning into the driveway where the truck and an attached trailer were located, when he was struck from behind by an uninsured driver.

Plaintiff sustained injuries, and sought UM benefits under the insured’s policy. The UM policy defined “insured” to include “[a]nyone else ‘occupying’ or using a covered ‘auto’ or temporary substitute for a covered ‘auto’.” The policy defined “occupying” as “in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.” The insurer denied coverage, arguing that plaintiff was not an “insured” under the policy because he was neither “occupying” nor “using” the truck while operating the tractor.

The court held that plaintiff was “occupying” the truck, since he was in the process of “getting on” it when he was struck. The court also concluded that plaintiff was “using” the vehicle. The court reasoned that, when an individual is separated from a vehicle at the time of an accident, whether that individual is “using” the vehicle depends on whether there is a causal connection between the that vehicle and the injury. The court noted several relevant factors:

?whether the individual was in reasonably close proximity to the insured vehicle at the time of the accident;

? whether the individual was vehicle oriented as opposed to highway or sidewalk oriented;

? whether the individual had relinquished control of the vehicle; and

? whether the individual was engaged in a transaction reasonably related to the use of the vehicle at the time of the accident.

The court concluded that plaintiff was “using the vehicle because his injuries were both “causally connected to the use of the” truck and were “foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the” truck. The court found the tractor “was in reasonably close proximity to the insured vehicle at the time of the accident,” and was vehicle oriented in that plaintiff was turning into the driveway when struck. In addition, plaintiff was “engaged in a transaction reasonably related to the use of the vehicle,” i.e., he was driving the tractor so that it could be loaded onto the attached trailer. Since the plaintiff was “occupying” and “using” the insured vehicle, he qualified as an “insured” eligible for UM benefits under the policy.

E. Coli Claims Deemed Single "Occurrence"

Western World Ins. Co. v. Wilkie, 5:06-cv-64 (E.D.N.C. November 1, 2007)

A federal district court has ruled that claims against a petting zoo arising out of outbreak of e. coli only triggered a single “occurrence” limit. Applying a “cause” test, Judge Howard ruled  that claims by numerous children who came into contact with fecal matter in the course of a week while visiting the petting zoo at the state fair all of the claims arose out of exposure to the same general harmful conditions (the presence of e. coli at the zoo).

 

NY Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Insurer

In an action to stay arbitration of uninsured motorist arbitration, a New York appellate court dismissed the proceeding against an insurer for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Matter of American Transit Ins. Co. v. Hoque (NY App., 1st Dept., Nov. 8, 2007), the court concluded the insurer was not doing business in New York, since it was a Pennsylvania company not licensed to do business in New York; it maintained no offices in New York; had no bank accounts and had no agents operating out of or representatives soliciting business in New York; and, did not own or possess real property in New York. The court also found that the insurer was not transacting business in New York merely because the driver of the offending vehicle, which was registered in Pennsylvania, drove the vehicle in this state, as this was not “purposeful activity” on the part of the insurer.

Two-year Contractual Period Enforced

In The Beekman Regent Condominium Assoc.v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co. (NY App. 1st Dept., Nov. 8, 2007), the court dismissed as untimely plaintiff’s action commenced after the policy’s two-year limitations period ran. The court rejected the insureds' arguments that they were unaware of the limitations clause due to the length of the policy, since “an insured has an obligation to read his or her policy and is presumed to have consented to its terms.” The court also concluded that the insurer was under no obligation to call plaintiffs’ attention to the clause, and that its participation in settlement negotiations “either before or after expiration of a limitations period contained in a policy is not, without more, sufficient to prove waiver or estoppel.”

Ninth Circuit Holds That Claims Aren't "Related" For E&O Purposes

The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a California District Court erred in holding that investors suits against a fund manager were barred from coverage as being “related” to claims that other investors brought against the insured prior to the date that AISLIC’s “claims made” Investment Managers policy. In Financial Managers Advisors, LLC v. American International Specialty Lines Ins. Co., No. 06-55001 (9th Cir. November 5, 2007), the court held that the newer claims involved new claimants and different “wrongful acts.” As a result, even though the new claims involved allegations of fraud and misrepresentation involving the same investment vehicles as was at issue in the earlier case, the court ruled that it did not believe that “the term ‘related’ was intended to bar recovery where two investors are advised to invest in the same fund.”

Popcorn Worker Claims Treated As Separate Occurrences

The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court has ruled in International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of America,  (App. Div. October 30, 2007) that claims by toxic tort claims presented by workers in a microwave packaging plant who suffered respiratory injuries as the result of exposure to a popcorn butter flavoring additive were separate “occurrences” and therefore required the insured to pay separate “occurrence” deductibles for each claim. In keeping with the Court of Appeals’ recent GE decision, the court ruled that these claims could not be grouped as a single “occurrence” since they involved exposures that occurred in different places over a period of many years.

South Dakota Supreme Court Finds No Duty to Defend or Indemnify Claim Arising from Extra-Marital Affair

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Harbert, No. 24366-a-TUCKER, 2007 SD 107 (S.D. October 24, 2007)

The South Dakota Supreme Court held this week that State Farm has no duty to defend or indemnify a claim brought against its insured for wife stealing after an extra-marital affair between the insured and the underlying plaintiff’s now ex-wife. The court found that the claim, which was essentially an alienation of affections claim, is an intentional tort, falling within State Farm’s intentional tort exclusion in the subject personal liability umbrella policy. The court also found that insuring an alienation of affections cause of action for an insured was contrary to the public policy of South Dakota.

Certificate of Insurance Insufficient to Confer Additional Insured Coverage

International Couriers Corp. v North River Ins. Co. (NY App., 1st Dept., Oct. 30, 2007)

Court held that certificate of insurance naming plaintiff as additional insured was not sufficient to confer coverage in light of clear policy language; damages for insured’s breach of obligation to procure insurance limited to out-of pocket expenses where plaintiff obtained its own policy.

Business Records Exception to Hearsay Rule Inapplicable to Insured's Statement in Insurance Investigation Report

Hochhauser v. Electric Ins. Co. (NY App. Oct. 23, 2007)

Court holds that neither insured's statement in insurance investigation report, nor testimony regarding statement, are admissible at a hearing under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, since insured lacks a business duty, as opposed to a contractual duty, to report to insurer in the course of its investigation regarding insurance coverage.

Buckling and Bowing of Ceiling Beams Allegedly Caused by Insured's Defective Roof Repairs Constitutes Covered "Property Damage"

Webster v. Acadia Ins. Co. (NH Oct. 17, 2007)

Court holds insurer obligated to defend insured against claim for damages resulting from roof repairs. Court found complaint alleged claims beyond insured’s defective roof replacement, to include buckling, bowing, lateral movement, and separation of ceiling beams from building frame, that were direct result of insured’s work. The damages represented actual damage to property separate and distinct from insured’s own work product.

Bona Fide Reliance on Experts as a Bad Faith Defense

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently recognized that an insurer's reliance on the reports of objective experts is a defense to bad faith allegations when it affirmed a district court’s summary judgment in favor of a health insurer regarding an insured’s extra-contractual claims.  In Henry v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 2007 WL 2897966 (5th Cir. October 05, 2007), the plaintiffs, on behalf of their deceased son, filed suit against Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company (“MOIC”), the issuer of their son’s health insurance coverage, alleging that MOIC’s denial of coverage for intravenous immunoglobulin (“IVIG”) replacement therapy caused their son to commit suicide.  The federal district court granted MOIC’s motion for summary judgment and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

 

The plaintiffs’ extra contractual claims were the sole subject of the appeal.  The Fifth Circuit explained the plaintiffs’ claims under the DTPA, Insurance Code, and for common law bad faith all failed because MOIC had a reasonable basis for its decision to deny coverage.  The court explained: “[p]lainly put, an insurer will not be faced with a tort suit for challenging a claim of coverage if there was any reasonable basis for denial of that coverage.”   The Fifth Circuit found MOIC’s reliance upon the proffered opinions of several board-certified doctors who reviewed the insured’s claim demonstrated good faith.  The court rejected the insured’s argument that the reports prepared by MOIC’s in-house and independent physicians were not objective, because these physicians were paid by MOIC.  The court noted that the doctors were not “patently off-base in their analysis and conclusions” and their professional justifications were not “illegitimate or specious.”  The court concluded by explaining: “[t]he question is not whether in the end MOIC’s doctors were right or wrong in their diagnosis of [the insured’s] condition and medical needs; the question is whether their methods and conclusions were reasonable, and whether MOIC was reasonable in relying on these conclusions.”  The Fifth Circuit affirmed because it was satisfied that MOIC did not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing, stating that MOIC clearly had a reasonable basis on which to deny coverage of its insured’s IVIG treatment for lack of medical necessity.

 

Editor’s Note:  Although this case arises out of a health insurance context, the Fifth Circuit’s broad pronouncements about the standards applicable to determine whether an insurer’s reliance on experts in evaluating claims is proper will have applicability to any first party insurance claim where the insurer retains one or more expert consultants to evaluate some aspect of the submitted claim. 

Two-year Statute of Limitations Applies to Bad Faith Claims

Ash v Continental Ins. Co. (Pa. Oct. 11, 2007)

In an action for bad faith following denial of a first-party property claim for damages caused by fire, Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that claim was barred by two-year statute of limitations applied to tort actions. Court rejected argument that six-year limitations period applicable to breach of contract and other claims should apply, concluding that the duty imposed under Pennsylvania’s bad faith insurance statute (42 Pa.C.S. § 8371) derives primarily from the law of torts.

Insurer's Principal Place of Business Controls Choice of Law

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v Foster Wheeler Corp. (NY Oct. 11, 2007)

For reasons stated in the intermediate appellate court’s decision below (Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v Foster Wheeler Corp., 36 AD3d 17 (1st Dept. 2006)), New York’s high court affirms that, in determining the law governing liability policies covering multistate risks, the state of the insured's principal place of business is the primary factor and should be regarded as a proxy for the principal location of the insured risk, which is a controlling factor in determining the law applicable to a liability policy. Court reasoned that state of the insured's principal place of business has a greater concern with issues of policy construction and application bearing on the amount of coverage than do states where contracting, negotiation, or payment of the premium happened to occur.

Bridge Repair Damages Excluded as "Inherent Vice"

City of Renton v. Lexington Ins. Co. (USA), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69959 (W.D. Wash. September 9, 2007)

In an unpublished decision, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington recently held that even a strictly construed "inherent vice" clause encompassed the error in design of the "Monster Road Bridge" in Renton, Washington where the design error (and not any other event) led to cracks in the girders of the bridge and caused the City's loss for costs of repair.  Because the defendant insurers were entitled to summary judgment, the re-insurer defendants were also entitled to judgment as as a matter of law as there was no obligation to “follow the settlement” and reimburse the underlying insurers for payment to the insured. 

Bad Faith Claim Dismissed

Zeldin v. Interboro Mut. Indemnity Ins. Co. (NY App., 2nd Dept., Oct. 2, 2007)

Plaintiff, who obtained judgment against insured for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accident, obtained an assignment of insured’s rights under policy and commenced bad faith action against carrier. Court held that dismissal of suit was proper. While plaintiff provided written notice to insurer, the insured did not.  Plaintiff, who stands in the insured’s shoes for purposes of this action, was therefore estopped from contending that insurer improperly disclaimed coverage. Significantly, plaintiff did not commence declaratory judgment action in her capacity as injured party. As a result, any defenses that insurer might have had against insured were good as against plaintiff.

Workers' Comp Carriers Afford Concurrent Coverage

AIU Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (Sup. Ct., NY Cty., Oct. 2, 2007)

Court holds that insurer providing workers’ compensation coverage under wrap-up plan with specific location endorsement entitled to contribution from carrier affording concurrent coverage for employer’s locations generally; evidence of parties’ contrary intent not admissible where policy terms unambiguous. Carrier seeking contribution not entitled to pre-judgment interest.

37-Day Delay in Disclaiming Coverage Deemed Unreasonable

Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc. v. Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (NY App., 1st Dept., Oct. 2, 2007)

Court holds that 37-day delay between insurer’s receipt of report from investigator detailing accident and its letter disclaiming coverage was unreasonable as a matter of law under NY Insurance Law § 3420(d), since the reasons for disclaimer were readily apparent from documents, including notice of claim and investigation report.

Delay in Disclaiming Coverage for Late Notice Excused for Investigation

Tully Construction Co., Inc. v. TIG Ins. Co. (NY App. 2nd Dept. Sept. 27, 1007)

Court holds that excess carrier’s delay in disclaiming coverage for late notice was not unreasonable under NY Ins. Law §3420(d), where insurer was presented with circumstances, including representations form its insured, that notice had previously been provided by the insured’s broker. Thus, timeliness of notice was not immediately apparent to the insurer upon receipt of the claim, but warranted further investigation.

Involuntary Assignment of Bad Faith Claim Improper

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estep (Ind. Sept. 25, 2007)

Insurer repeatedly offered settlement of auto accident claim for full policy limits, but plaintiff refused. When jury returned verdict in excess of limits, trial court ordered assignment of insured’s bad faith claim over insured’s objection. Bad faith claim was premised on perceived conflict in defense counsel’s representation of insured. Court held that involuntary assignment of claims against carriers whose insureds do not believe they have been wronged by their insurers was inconsistent with direct action rule. Permitting forced assignments would result in multiple litigation, would adversely impact settlement negotiations, and would increase costs to insureds who never make a claim and find their insurance service satisfactory.

No Duty to Defend Where Complaint Alleges Excluded Conduct

Del Monte Fresh Produce v. Transportation Insurance Co. (7th Cir. 2007)

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Transportation on the duty to defend on the basis that coverage was excluded as the underlying class action complaints alleged Del Monte had knowledge of falsity regarding its claim to the USPTO and in industry publications that its Fresh Del Monte Gold pineapples were "extra sweet." 

 

No Coverage for Landlord After Fire Causes Damage to Leased Premises

Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Mason Park Partners LP (5th Cir. 2007)

After a fire at the Taste of Katy restaurant caused property damage, the insured owner of the restaurant and its landlord made claims under the insured's Commercial Property Coverage and Commercial General Liability policies.  Affirming the district court, the Fifth Circuit found that under Texas contract law there were no ambiguities in the policy and that the landlord was not covered under either the property or commercial general liability parts.   Additionally, because the landlord did not have coverage under the policy, the Fifth Circuit found it could not maintain its statutory claims including violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act.

Excess Carriers Promising to Indemnify for Damages Not Obligated to Fund Voluntary Settlement

Aerojet-General Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (Cal. App., 3rd Dist., Sept. 13, 2007)

Court holds that excess carriers were not obligated to indemnify insured for sums insured agreed to pay as settlement of CERCLA claims, as sums were paid as part of settlement, and not court-adjudicated award of damages. Court relied on Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.4th 945 (2001), reasoning that term “damages” means only money ordered by a court to be paid.

Van Conversion Not "Maintenance" Within Auto Exclusion

Guishard v. General Security Ins. Co. (NY Sept. 11, 2007)

Court holds that CGL policy’s auto exclusion bars coverage for injuries sustained while riveting metal on a van for the purpose of converting it to an ice cream truck. The activity was not "maintenance" within the meaning of a CGL policy's auto exclusion, as the work did not involve "an intrinsic part of the mechanism of the car and its overall function."

Anti-concurrent Causation Langue Enforceable

Cali v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (NY App. 2d Dept. Aug. 14, 2007)

Court holds that anti-concurrent causation language in property policy precludes coverage for damage caused by excluded earth movement despite that collapse was caused in part by covered decay.