More on the Oregon Supreme Court's Opinion in Goddard

As reported earlier by Mike Aylward below, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled on Thursday that the maximum constitutionally acceptable punitive damages award is four times the amount of compensatory damages. The case, Goddard v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Oregon, concerns Farmers’ claims handling with respect to a car accident that occurred in 1987and the resultant wrongful death action filed against Farmers’ insured. Farmers undertook the insured’s defense but failed to settle Goddard’s wrongful death action within policy limits, after which a jury returned a verdict that resulted in a judgment against the insured for $863,274. The insured, who asserted that Farmers’ failure to settle was an act of bad faith, assigned his bad faith claim to Goddard who prosecuted the action and obtained an $863,274 compensatory damages award at trial along with an award of $20,718,576 in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals reduced the punitive damages award finding that the punitive damages award was grossly excessive and therefore unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. As Mike outlines below, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals finding that a ratio of 4:1 was constitutionally acceptable.

In making its decision, the court reviewed the “guideposts” recited by the US Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559, 568 (1996) and State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 US 408 (2003), in analyzing punitive damages awards for excessiveness. Of particular note is the court’s determination that the 4:1 ratio was appropriate in this case as opposed to the recent $79.5 million punitive damages award it upheld several weeks ago which is summarized in our prior post concerning the Williams v. Phillip Morris case. The court specifically stated that an award that exceeds the single-digit ratio may be acceptable in a “few narrow circumstances” including when “extraordinarily reprehensible” conduct is involved such as the conduct in Williams. The court referenced the fact that only economic harm was present in this case and Farmers’ conduct was not comparable to the conduct of Phillip Morris’ “50-year campaign to delude a large part of the population of Oregon about the potentially devastating physical effects of smoking its products.” The court ultimately determined that the 4:1 ratio was constitutionally permissible and directed remand for a new trial unless the plaintiff agreed to remittitur of punitive damages to four times the compensatory damages award. This is not likely to be the court’s last take on what is a constitutionally permissible punitive damages award.

Insurance Coverage and Claims Institute in April 2008

Sara Thorpe is the chair and speaker, and Mike Aylward, a speaker, at the DRI's Insurance Coverage and Claims Institute in Chicago in April 2008.  The topics to be covered include conflicts of interest, drafting effective reservation of rights letters, independent counsel, settlements, litigation management, e-discovery, emerging insurance coverage issues for commercial and personal lines carriers, and "bad faith."  This seminar is perfect for insurance professionals and lawyers who represent them, both the novice and the experienced.  More information available at: www.dri.org/open/CLE.aspx?sem20080155 or www.dri.org

 

Interest Term In Consent Judgment Held Binding On Insurer

The Washington Court of Appeals has ruled that in a case where the plaintiff and the insured entered into a consent judgment wherein the insured admitted liability and agreed to a judgment of $275,000 with interest to accrue at 12% a year, which judgment was subsequently approved by a Superior Court at a reasonableness hearing, the 12% rate of interest was binding on Scottsdale instead of the ordinary rate of interest provided for under RCW 4.56.110(3) (that would have resulted in interest accruing at a rate of 7.18%). In Jackson v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 59606-3-I (Wash. App. December 17, 2007), the court ruled that when parties to a tort suit settle their dispute in a manner that calls for a specified rate of interest, the resulting judgment is founded on a written contract rather than tortious conduct and is properly subject to the higher rate of interest provided for by RCW 4.56.110.