Insurance Litigation Lawyer & Attorney : National Insurance Law Forum : Insurance Coverage, Bad Faith Litigation

Back in December, the Florida Supreme Court had answered a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit in Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Pozzi Window Co., No. SC06-779 (Fla. December 20, 2007) that a lawsuit brought against a contractor for water damage caused by the defective installation of windows at a multi-million dollar house in Coconut Grove was not covered since CGL policies do not cover the cost of repair and replacement of defective work.

In Pozzi Window Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court the issue of whether the defective windows were completed works such that the cost of repairing or replacing the defective windows fell within the scope of the policy’s coverage for claims within the “products/completed operations hazard.” In light of recent Florida appellate decisions that have split on the issue of whether repair or replacement costs are covered under a CGL policy, the Eleventh Circuit asked the Florida Supreme Court to answer whether a standard CGL policy that included coverage for claims within the products/completed operations hazard would cover a general contractor’s liability to a third party for the cost of repairing or replacing defective work by its subcontractor. Unlike its opinion J.S.U.B., the Florida Supreme Court observed that in this case, while the defective installation of the windows was an “occurrence,” the cost of repairing and removing defective work was not a claim for “property damage.”

Last week, however, the Florida Supreme Court withdrew its December 20, 2007 opinion and declared in Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Pozzi Window Co., No. SCO6-779 (Fla. June 12, 2008) that it was unable to answer the Eleventh Circuit’s certified question owing to the fact that the court had failed to clarify whether the water damage resulted from defective installation, for which there would not be coverage, or defects in the installed windows themselves. In keeping with its  opinion  in U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. JSUB, the Supreme Curt noted that if the windows were not defective prior to their installation, coverage would exist for the cost of repair or replacement of the windows because there was physical injury to tangible property (the windows) caused by their defective installation by a subcontractor. However, a different result would follow if the windows were in a defective condition before being installed and the damage to the completed project was therefore caused by defective windows rather than faulty installation alone.

The insurers intervened to challenge the reasonableness of the settlement. Unlike some other cases in Washington where this has been done, however, the trial court allowed adequate discovery so the insurers could investigate the potentially collusive covenant judgment.

The Judge was clearly displeased by what he found to be a collusive arrangement that erodes the integrity of the adversarial system – and was in this instance orchestrated to the benefit of the settling parties in derogation of an insurer’s rights:

[T]he court has no confidence in the integrity of this settlement, and the court has grave concern that, as evidenced by the facts of this case, the use of such settlements with covenants not to execute has the potential to become a ‘cottage industry’ within the practice of law, undermining the respect owed to the honorable profession.

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When, in the context of an adversary proceeding, the parties, heretofore at odds, unite for the purpose of mutual benefit, and for the purpose of shifting the risk of loss to a third party, the truth’s protections inherent in a truly adversary proceeding are lost, and that confidence is eroded.

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Our Supreme Court has held that a statute which limits general damages in tort cases deprives a litigant of the right of a jury trial, in violation of the state constitution. It is not clear to me why the same could not be said of a judicial process which establishes presumptive damages in anticipation of bad faith litigation.

In the end, the Court concluded that $400,000, not $8,750,000, would be a reasonable settlement.

Briefing has yet to be filed, so a decision from the appellate court is likely more than a year away; but this is a case to watch.

In this case, MOE defended its insured, Dan Paulson Construction, Inc. (“DPCI”) under a reservation of rights against construction defect claims brought by the Martinellis related to damages to their personal residence that DPCI constructed. DPCI and the Martinellis proceeded to arbitration on the claims. Shortly before the arbitration hearing, MOE filed a declaratory judgment action in the state court against both DPCI and the Martinellis seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify on the basis of the “Your Work” exclusion. MOE did not serve this action on either DPCI or the Martinellis. 

On December 30, 2003, MOE issued a subpoena duces tecum in the un-served state court declaratory judgment action on the arbitrator seeking documents and the arbitrator’s thoughts regarding the arbitration. With the subpoena, MOE sent the arbitrator an ex parte cover letter explaining its coverage issues with DPCI.  Both DPCI and the Martinellis received the subpoena two business days prior to the arbitration hearing. MOE did not serve the cover letter to the arbitrator on either DPCI or the Martinellis. MOE then sent a second letter to the arbitrator slightly narrowing its original requests and further explaining its coverage dispute with DPCI. Subsequently MOE struck the subpoena and dismissed its first declaratory judgment action. The parties thereafter negotiated a settlement and entered into a stipulated settlement agreement which provided in part that DPCI would assign its coverage and bad faith claims against MOE to the Martinellis. 

MOE subsequently filed the subject coverage action against DPCI and the Martinellis.  On several motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that MOE acted in bad faith but that MOE had successfully rebutted the presumption of harm. The Court of Appeals reversed holding that MOE did not act in bad faith. The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s decision that MOE acted in bad faith and further found that MOE failed in rebutting the presumption of harm.  As to bad faith, the court found that through its subpoena and two ex parte letters to the arbitrator, MOE “clearly showed great concern for its monetary interest in establishing which of the Martinellis’ claims were excluded from coverage under DPCI’s policy [while displaying] little to no concern for how its conduct might affect DPCI’s financial risk, which was then being litigated in the arbitration hearing.” The court found that MOE’s actions therefore “conclusively” demonstrated that it had a greater concern for its monetary interest than for DPCI’s financial risk.

The court then determined that MOE did not rebut the presumption of harm arising from its bad faith conduct as it failed to show that its subpoena and ex parte communications did not harm or prejudice DPCI. To the contrary, the court found that the record supported a finding that MOE’s conduct caused significant uncertainly and increased risk for DPCI’s defense. The court rejected the trial court’s initial conclusion that DPCI’s decision to proceed with the arbitration coupled with a subsequent settlement within policy limits effectively rebutted the presumption that MOE’s bad faith harmed DPCI. The court stated that “loss of control of the case is in itself prejudicial to the insured.” 

The court specifically stated that it was not expanding its prior rulings on the presumption of harm to conduct that occurs in connection with an insurer’s coverage duties. Rather, the finding of harm in this case was directly related to conduct during the defense case as, despite the fact that the bad faith conduct was perpetrated by coverage counsel, MOE’s conduct was associated with its underlying defense of DPCI and could not be “reasonably segregated from that defense [as it] interfered directly in that defense.”