Oregon District Court Addresses a "Multi-Unit Residential Building" Exclusion

In FountainCourt Homeowners’ Assn. v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107403, filed on November 16, 2009, District Court Judge Ann Aiken, employed Oregon law to examine the application of a “multi-unit residential building” exclusion in a commercial general liability policy. In FountainCourt, the plaintiffs were two owners’ associations representing condominium and townhome unit owners at FountainCourt, a development containing both condominiums and townhomes. American Family insured the siding contractor involved in the construction of FountainCourt, and the general contractor was an additional named insured under the siding contractor’s American Family polices. After plaintiffs sued the general and siding contractors for construction defects at FountainCourt, the general contractor tendered the defense and indemnity of the plaintiffs’ claims to American Family. American Family denied the tender, relying in large part on the policies’ exclusion for multi-unit new residential construction. The plaintiffs then filed a breach of contract action against American Family alleging bad faith.

 

The exclusion on which American Family relied provided that the insurance does not apply to “property damage” arising out of “your work” or “your product” in connection with any “multi-unit residential building.” The policies at issue defined “multi-use residential building” as “a condominium, townhouse, apartment or similar structure, each of which has greater than eight units built for the purpose of residential occupancy.” While there was no dispute whether the exclusion did or did not apply to certain of the buildings at FountainCourt, the plaintiffs took the position that the exclusion did not apply to certain of the remaining buildings because they were “mixed use,” meaning the buildings contained condominiums and townhomes. The plaintiffs asserted that the exclusion’s phrase “similar structure” did not include the mixed-use buildings at issue, and also argued that the exclusion was ambiguous because it was as reasonable to include mixed-use buildings in the definition of “multi-unit residential building” as it would be to include them.

 

The court found that the exclusion precluded coverage for any building having greater than eight units regardless of which type of unit it contains. Important to the court’s finding was the exclusion’s requirement that the structure be “built or used for the purpose of residential occupancy.” As each unit was built to be used as a residence, the fact that the units were “mixed ownership,” that is, some being townhomes and some condominiums, did not affect the application of the multi-unit exclusion.

 

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the exclusion’s application depended on whether the owners of at least nine residential units in a building have the same rights, or incidents of ownership. The court pointed out that, if such an interpretation were correct, it would be possible for owners of units within a multi-unit structure to avoid the application of the exclusion simply by changing the incidents of ownership to reduce the total number of residential units that share common incidents of ownership in order to fall below the nine unit threshold of the multi-unit exclusion. The court found that the exclusion unambiguously applied to units that are “built or used for residential occupancy” and a that structure that contained more than eight residential units when built triggers the exclusion even if some units are later converted to other uses or modes of ownership. Thus, the court found that the exclusion applies to any building that is similar in structure to a condominium, townhouse or apartment that is built to include more than eight residential units no matter how the individual units in the structure are legally owned.
 

Oregon District Court Finds No Coverage to Remove and Replace an Insured's Defective Work

In Shilo Inn, Seaside Oceanfront, LLC v. Grant, et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75255 (D. Or. Aug. 24, 2009), the District Court of Oregon granted summary judgment to an insurer, ruling that an exclusion for property damage to “[t]hat particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired, or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it” barred all coverage for the costs of replacing the insured contractor’s defective work.

 

Shilo had contracted with the insured, James Grant, to install various granite components in its hotel. However, Shilo initiated arbitration proceedings after it determined that the granite tub surrounds had not been properly installed. The arbitrator agreed that much of Grant’s work was “defective and faulty” and that water intrusion had occurred, but he also found the evidence insufficient with respect to the scope of water intrusion. The arbitrator awarded Shilo damages for the cost to remove and replace the improperly installed granite.

 

After converting the arbitration award into a judgment, Shilo filed a Writ of Garnishment in an attempt to collect insurance proceeds from Maryland Casualty Company, which had insured Grant. However, upon Maryland Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court agreed that the only damages awarded to Shilo in the arbitration fit within the exclusion for property damage to “[t]hat particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired, or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it.”

Although Shilo has filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit and, therefore, the ultimate result in this case could change, the District Court’s decision serves as a reminder of the importance of distinguishing between mere construction defects on one hand and actual damage caused by construction defects on the other. Where no resulting damage is proven, the coverage terms and exclusions of many general liability policies may be sufficient to defeat coverage. Moreover, even when resulting damage is proven, coverage may be limited to the cost to repair the resulting damages. Because correcting defects is often more expensive than repairing damages, this limitation can be significant and should not be overlooked.

 

Oregon Federal Court Addresses Who Is An Insured

In Mt. Hood, LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16775 (March 3, 2009), the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon analyzed whether an individual and a corporation qualified as insureds under a policy issued to a condominium homeowners association. The HOA, Collins Lake Resort Homeowners Association, sued Mt. Hood, LLC and Kirk Hanna for damages based on breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties. The complaint alleged that Mt. Hood was the developer and that Hanna was both a board member of the HOA and a representative of Mt. Hood. The HOA alleged that Mt. Hood and Hanna were aware of construction defects at the resort and failed to inform the owners. The HOA also alleged that Hanna breached his fiduciary duty by assisting Mt. Hood in not paying its share of expenses and repair costs while Hanna was on the board of directors of the HOA. Mt. Hood and Hanna claimed that Travelers breached its insurance contract by denying the duty to defend.
 

Because the lawsuit did not allege that Mt. Hood was a board member or subsidiary of the HOA, Travelers argued that Mt. Hood did not qualify as an insured. Mt. Hood claimed that since the complaint alleged that Mt. Hood controlled the board and the HOA for a period of time, Mt. Hood was effectively on the board. The court rejected this argument. Following Oregon law, the court determined that it could only consider the complaint and the policy when analyzing the duty to defend. The court found that in reviewing the complaint, it was clear that there was no allegation that Mt. Hood itself was a member of the board, even if it did control the actions of the board. The court focused on the allegation in the complaint that Hanna had been elected as the sole board member. The court granted Travelers motion to dismiss as to Mt. Hood’s claims.

 

With respect to Hanna, Travelers argued he was not an insured because the claims were filed against Hanna outside the policy period as required by the policy. Travelers argued that because the suit was not brought within the policy period, there was no coverage. The court found, however, that because the policy only required that a “claim” for monetary damages be brought against the board member within the policy period, the demand for money damages prior to the complaint qualified as a “claim” under the policy. Travelers also argued that an exclusion for damages arising out of construction defects applied. The court found that the policy’s coverage for “breach of duty,” and the allegations in the complaint, were broad enough, such that claims for damages other than solely construction defects could be recovered. The court, therefore, rejected Travelers motion to dismiss the claim for breach of the duty to defend Hanna.
 

New York U.S. District Court Dismisses Coverage Complaint for Accident at Non-Scheduled Location

In Ten Seventy One Home Corp. v. Liberty Mutual, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 47328 (2008), the court granted an insurer’s CR 12(b)(6) motion dismissing another insurer’s complaint seeking a coverage determination for a personal injury claim.

On June 14, 2002, Leonard Hutchings was seriously, severely and permanently injured when Morton Yuter closed an overhead garage door on Hutchings’ head and neck at 3001 Arlington Avenue in the Bronx, New York. Josh Neustein and Ten Seventy One Home Corporation owned 3001 Arlington and used it as an office from which they operated, administered and maintained a number of rental properties in the Bronx and Manhattan.
Hutchings sued Yuter, Neustein and Ten Seventy One for his injuries. They tendered the defense and indemnification of Hutching’s suit to their insurer, Liberty Mutual, who disclaimed coverage. Yuter, Neustein and Ten Seventy One then sued Liberty Mutual for defense and indemnification. Liberty brought a third party action against Greenwich Insurance seeking a declaration that Yuter, Neustein and Ten Seventy One are insureds under its policies and that the policies are primary to the Liberty policies. Greenwich issued two liability policies, both of which were in effect on the date of the accident, but neither of which listed 3001 Arlington a designated premises for coverage.

The Greenwich policies included endorsements titled “Limitation of Coverage to Designated Premises or Project.” The endorsement provided coverage for “bodily injury . . . arising out of . . . the ownership, maintenance or use of the premises shown in the Schedule and operations necessary or incidental to those premises” (emphasis added). Neither Greenwich policy Schedule listed 3001 Arlington as a designated premises. Liberty argued that 3001 Arlington, as the office for premises that were listed on the Greenwich policies’ Schedule, was covered as “operations necessary or incidental to” the other, scheduled premises.

Greenwich moved to dismiss Liberty’s complaint pursuant to CR 12(b)(6) and the court granted its motion. It explained the phrase “operations necessary or incidental to” scheduled premises has a spatial meaning extending the premises listed on the schedule to certain non-scheduled, appurtenant spaces such as location entryways “necessary or incidental” to the enjoyment or use of the insured premises. The court refused to more broadly construe the phrase to include 3001 Arlington. The fact that 3001 Arlington was Ten Seventy One’s business address did not allow Liberty to essentially reform the Greenwich policies to hold it liable for insuring a premise not contemplated in its agreements with its insured.

Two Oklahoma Federal Courts Rule on Diversity Issues in Insurance Disputes

On May 21, 2008, in Wormuth v. State Farm, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40668, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma awarded a plaintiff insured attorney’s fees incurred in responding to State Farm’s notice of removal based on fraudulent joinder. Wormuth sued State Farm and two State Farm investigators in Oklahoma state court. State Farm filed a notice of removal claiming the two investigators were fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The trial court disagreed, found no fraudulent joinder and so no diversity jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court.

Wormuth sued for attorney’s fees incurred in responding to State Farm’s removal petition, relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) which allows a court to award attorney’s fees where the removing party lacks an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. State Farm argued the federal court lacked jurisdiction to consider Wormuth’s motion because she failed to request fees in the remand order itself and because its removal was based on objectively reasonable grounds. The trial court found State Farm lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removing the case and awarded Wormuth 60% of the fees requested.

Also on May 21, 2008, in Gulley v. Farmers Ins., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40666, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma held the jurisdictional requirement for diversity jurisdiction had been met after considering together the allegations in plaintiff Gulley’s complaint and defendant Farmers’s notice of removal. Gulley sued Farmers for breach of contract and bad faith for failure to timely evaluate and pay Gulley’s underinsured motorists claim, alleging, among other things, that she had “repeatedly requested” Farmers provide her an evaluation of her claim but Farmers failed to do so. Her complaint sought contract damages of $30,000, unspecified compensatory damages and punitive damages “greater than $10,000.”

Farmers’ petition stated that Oklahoma law allowed a punitive damages award equal to actual damages or $100,000, whichever is greater. The punitive damages number together with the allegations in Gulley’s complaint that Farmers ignored her repeated requests to evaluate her claim, that she was owed $30,000 on her breach of contract and that her unspecified compensatory damages may conceivably include emotional distress or economic damages resulting from Farmers’ conduct, persuaded the court that the amount in controversy had been met.