PIP Insurer Required to Defend Process for Denying Claims

Oregon courts have consistently held that an insurance company may only be liable for tortuous bad faith in situations where it is defending its insured.  In Ivanov v. Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon, the Oregon Supreme Court addressed an insurer’s obligations under personal injury protection (PIP) coverage.  The decision itself addresses an insurer’s obligation to pay medical payments under Oregon’s PIP coverage statutes.  Ivanov sought certification of a class and summary judgment regarding denial of PIP benefits “solely on the basis of generalized criteria not specific to claimants’ injuries” and that PIP benefits may not be denied “unless [the] determination is based on a contemporaneous physical examination of the insured by a physician selected by Farmers.”  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers on Farmers’ corresponding motion for summary judgment on the ground that the PIP statute does not require an IME prior to denial of the claim and that the insured bears the burden of proving that medical expenses were reasonable and necessary.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision, but held that plaintiff had failed to produce evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that the claimed expenses were necessary.
The plaintiffs’ claims are that the system Farmers uses to deny claims for medical expenses constitutes breach of contract, fraud, breach of the implied duty of good faith, and tortious breach of the duty of good faith. The Oregon Supreme Court notes that in the argument before both of the lower courts and the Oregon Supreme Court, there was no discussion as to the elements of the theories of recovery. The claims are based on Farmers’ use of a computer system to analyze claims that resulted in automatic deductions, rather than a case-by-case review of the particular claims. The court reviewed the PIP statutes and found that ORS 742.524(1)(a) provides a presumption in favor of the necessity of medical expenses incurred by a health care provider. Once a claim is denied, the presumption is removed as well. The court noted, however, that the plaintiffs are not challenging the validity of the denials, but the investigation of the claims prior to the denial. The court held that at the time an insurer decides whether to accept or deny a PIP claim, the medical expenses incurred to that date are presumed to be reasonable and necessary. The court also held that since the summary judgment record did not demonstrate that the process Farmers uses is valid as a matter of law, Farmers was not entitled to summary judgment.

The court discussed an insurer’s duties of good faith to its insured before reaching its decision. In reaching its conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court found that “because Farmers’ review methodology was an impermissible one, Farmers needed to establish that the procedures it employed to deny plaintiffs’ claims satisfied its statutory and common law duties and did not violate the prohibitions set out in ORS 746.230(1)(d).” ORS 746.230(1)(d) prohibits an insurer from denying a claim without a reasonable investigation. Since Farmers did not present evidence that its claim review process was valid, the plaintiffs did not have to produce evidence that their medical expenses were medically necessary.

Policyholder Struck By Bicyclist after Parking Car Not Entitled to PIP Benefits

Reversing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff policyholder, the Oregon Court of Appeals found that a plaintiff’s injuries from being struck by a bicyclist as she crossed the street did not trigger PIP coverage under her auto insurance policy. In this case, the plaintiff had parked her car across the street from her residence and took several work related items from her back seat (although leaving her purse) and locked the car. She then crossed the street, descended a set of stairs to her home and opened the front door. Putting down the load she had taken from the car, she put a leash on her dog and walked with her dog across the street back to her car. She then unlocked the car doors and moved some of her personal times from the front seat to the hatchback of her car. She then closed and locked her car again and began to cross the street back to her house. When she was approximately three-quarters of the way across the road, she was struck by a cyclist riding down the hill and was injured.

After the accident, the plaintiff sought to recover her medical expenses and lost income and filed a claim for PIP benefits under her automobile policy with State Farm. State Farm denied the claim on the basis that the accident was not the result of her “use” or “occupancy” of her car and, thus, fell outside the coverage prescribed under the terms of her policy and the Oregon PIP statute. On summary judgment motions of both parties, the trial court found that the facts “show that the injury resulted form the use of the vehicle [and was] a consequence resulting from plaintiff’s use of the vehicle to transport and store items.” The trial court found that it was immaterial that she did not intend to return to her car again after locking it and that she might have taken the dog for a walk after crossing the street had she not been injured and thus, her injuries resulted from her “use” of the car.



The Court of Appeals reversed finding that a causal nexus between the use of the plaintiff’s car and the injury by the cyclist was lacking. The court found that there must be a “consequential nexus between the use and injurious event” for recovery to occur. Accordingly, in this case, there was no nexus as the injured cyclist “was going to be there regardless of plaintiff’s use of the car –and, other than in a pure “but for” sense, nothing about plaintiff’s use of the car enhanced the likelihood that she would suffer an injury because of being struck by a cyclist.”